Turkey's
Cultural Transformation
The Turkish experience in social and cultural transformation is
unique not only because of its totality and success in an Islamic
society, but also because of the synthesis it sought: an
amalgamation of western and pre-Islamic Turkish cultures to replace
the previously dominant Islamic culture.
Since the secular Turkish Republic was built upon the remnants of
the defeated Ottoman Empire after World War 1, it is necessary to
trace the seeds of change through the six centuries of the Empire as
well as during the era of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founding father
of the new state and society.
1. THE ROOTS OF CHANGE
The roots of the twentieth century change in Anatolia may be traced
back to the tenth and eleventh centuries. The crusaders might even
be said to have played a role in the future orientation of the
Ottoman Empire, by establishing important trade patterns with the
western Mediterranean.
As the Turkish Republic is one of the many successor states of the
Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to take a close look at the Empire
in order to understand the process of change in Ottoman Islamic
society which made possible the emergence of a secular one. Clearly,
the decline of the Ottomans and the reasons behind such a decline
are quite important factors for our analysis. Here we shall review
some of the reasons both external and internal which contributed to
the changing circumstances in the Empire.
1. External Factors
The external factors which are responsible for Ottoman decay may be
studied under two headings: the pattern of commercial relations
between the eastern Mediterranean and western Europe which was
established during the period of the Crusaders and the economic
changes which occurred after the discovery of the New World.
The two factors noted above merged into one mechanism which laid the
groundwork for the economic decline of the Empire: the Imtiyazat or
the Capitulations. As students of Ottoman history are aware, these
economic, commercial and legal privileges given to foreigners
eventually undermined the Empire economically and caused its final
collapse.
First of all the successors of the Crusaders, who formed small
states in the eastern Mediterranean area, had already been granted
some privileges such as tax exemptions and the right to form their
own courts long before the area fell under Ottoman rule. Thus, when
the Ottomans conquered the eastern Mediterranean, they also
recognized such special relations in commercial treaties. Actually,
since the Crusaders were of west European origin, even their family
ties were useful to help them obtain letters of credit and the
like.[] They also contributed greatly to the collapse of the
Byzantine economy which they by-passed to trade directly with
western Europe.[] Looking at the other side of the problem, the
existence of such trading groups within the Empire, which had very
special relations with western Europe and special legal privileges,
cannot be the sole reason for the later decline of the Empire. On
the contrary, in a sound and strong economy, these traders might
even become the agents for further economic development.
At this point one should recall the results of the exploration of
America. Such a discovery, symbolizing the establishment of new
trade routes, marked a turning point in the economic history of the
Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, a major inflation was caused by the
import of gold and silver into Europe from the New World. At about
the same time, a shift took place in the traditional trade routes
because the Portuguese had circumnavigated Africa. These events all
helped the Ottoman economy to become dependent on that of western
Europe.[] Inflation first affected Europe, causing the “leak” of raw
materials, especially grain, from the tightly-controlled Ottoman
economy, and then inflation crept towards the East, causing
financial bankruptcy in the Empire. The role of the “privileged”
minorities in such turmoil is not hard to imagine: economic
dependency on the West and exploitation by foreigners reached its
peak after the sixteenth century.
For later developments, Issawi’s world are quite illumination: “The
history of the last century and a half of the Ottoman Empire was
largely shaped by two forces: the national liberation movement of
the non-Turkish peoples and the steady encroachment of the Great
Powers.”[]
2. Internal Factors
It has always been very easy to blame external factors for the
decline of the Empire. But such an analysis may mislead us, as the
internal factors are also quite important. Regarding the decline of
the Ottomans, one should take the inflexible state structure into
account. The whole Ottoman political system was designed to
eliminate rivals to central power, the Sultan-Caliph. As Mardin has
stated, “with no feudalism, no hereditary princes and an institution
staffed with slaves as an executive organ, the Ottoman Empire,
superficially examined, seems to approximate the optimum equilibrium
of an ‘Oriental Despotism’ under which there are ideally only two
‘social sets’: the ruler and his executive servants on one hand and
the ruled on the other.”[]
A penetrating observer will quickly realize that a structure,
designed to suppress any kind of change, was set up to “keep each
man in his appropriate social position,” for the sake of “social
peace and order of the state.”[]
In this context, Gibb and Bowen stated that “The keynote of Ottoman
administration was conservatism, and all the institutions of
government were directed to the maintenance of the status quo.”[]
Actually the picture of the Ottoman structure traced above defines
an ‘ideal type.’ Thus the social, economic and political reality was
different from that of the ‘ideal structure.’ The weakness of the
Empire lay in an inflexible system, corrupted through social,
economic and political changes brought about by technological and
economic innovations from the ‘outside world.’
Among the results of such a stagnant structure which precipitated
the final collapse of the Empire, were the deterioration of the
state-owned land system, the disability of the feudal “intermediary
classes” which could not evolve themselves into “middle classes,”
the continuous adulteration of the Ottoman currency, the weakening
military and the eventual loss of territories especially after the
“nationalistic” movements that started in the Balkans.[]
II. THE PHASES OF INDUCED
CHANGE
The elites that undertook the agonizing task of saving the Empire
were members of the military and the civilian bureaucracy, since the
stagnation of Ottoman economic development prevented the rise of
another powerful class such as the bourgeoisie or other groups.[]
The bureaucracy was not alone in its efforts to ‘modernize’ the
Empire. The western powers who were exploiting the Ottoman market
were also among the interested parties. Great Britain, which had
signed a commercial treaty with the Empire in 1838 and had thereby
gained new economic ad commercial privileges was the chief foreign
power behind the Tanzimat (Reform) Edict of 1839.[]
many scholars tend to view the Tanzimat Edict or the Noble Rescript
of the Rose Chamber (Gulhane Hatt-i Serif) as a turning point in the
westernization efforts of the Ottoman Empire, though in actuality,
it followed Ottoman defeat in the face of European superiority in
economic and military matters. The document was nothing but a
systematical legalization of the rights which the minorities and the
central bureaucracy had already gained.
The Noble Rescript proclaimed such principles as the security of
life, honor, and property of the subject, the abolition of
tax-farming and all the abuses associated with it, regular and
orderly recruitment into the armed forces, fair and public trial of
persons accused of crimes, and equality of persons of all religions
in the application of theses laws. It was this last clause which
represented the most radical breach with ancient Islamic tradition,
and was therefore most shocking to Muslim principles and good
taste.[]
Though Lewis’ lines suggest that the Edict proclaimed a radical
change regarding the minorities, the most important part of it was
the recognition of the rights of the central bureaucracy which had
already become a political power in the Empire.[] Thus, the Edict,
which was declared as a result of modernization efforts up to that
date, actually gave a new impetus to domestic developments by
strengthening the leadership of the intelligentsia, namely the
military and civilian bureaucracy. The first domestic outcome of the
Tanzimat Edict was the intelligentsia’s articulation of a
constitutional state as a panacea for the disappearing Empire.
1. Toward a
Constitutional State: Young Ottomans and Young Turks
The origin and aims of the Young Ottomans were best described by
Mardin. He wrote that
In the summer of 1865 a picnic took place in the so-called Forest of
Belgrade, a wooded valley lying behind the hills of the Bosphorus.
Attending it were six young men who had decided to take action
against what they considered to be catastrophic policies pursued by
the Ottoman Government. What united these young conspirators was a
common knowledge of European civilization and an equal concern at
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.[]
Since those young men were reacting against the policies followed by
Ali Pasa and Fuad Pasa, who were themselves the students of Resid
Pasa, the architect of the Tanzimat, we can label their “Young
Ottoman Society” as the direct outcome of the Tanzimat. Actually,
Ali and Fuad were critical of Resid as being too mild. But then, it
was their turn to be accused of being too mild by the Young
Ottomans. Thus the concrete political aim of the revolutionary
society was formulated “to change the absolute Ottoman rule into a
constitutional state.”[] The word “Hurriyet” (freedom) became the
symbol of this utopian movement for the salvation of the Empire.
The Young Ottoman movement, mainly based on the ideas of the French
Revolution, was an elitist action. It failed to get the support of
the masses and confined itself to “intrigues of the palace” to
produce its aim: namely the proclamation of a constitution to
furnish “Hurriyet” to the masses.
Since Abdulhamid II had been proclaimed Sultan as a result of
traditional intrigues at the highest level, no public support was
shown for Midhat Pasa, the father of the constitution, when he was
dismissed, exiled and eventually killed by the very Sultan who had
put the constitution into effect in 1876. Then, Sultan Abdulhamid II
became a despot for the next thirty years.
Despite the fact the Abdulhamid’s promise for the proclamation of
the constitution was taken before his accession and that he acted
accordingly after his accession, the words “freedom” (hurriyet) and
constitution at that time lacked social and economic content, thus
enabling the Sultan to eliminate rivals through political maneuvers
without causing any disturbance among the masses of the Empire.
The second constitutional revolution was also a limited and local
military action against the Palace.[] A rebellion among a small
number of army troops in Macedonia, the assassination of two of the
Sultan’s hand-picked generals and most important of all a number of
telegrams sent to the Palace in the name of the secret society of
‘Union and Progress’ were enough to pursuade Sultan Abdulhamid to
restore the constitutions in 1908.[]
The Committee (later the Party) of Union and Progress did not have a
consistent ideology. It also lacked an economic view and program.
The Young Turks, who formed the Party of Union and Progress were
aiming at the restoration of a western-like, so-called ‘liberal’
constitution.[] The declining Ottoman Empire came under the control
of the Party of Union and Progress by World War I and, after its
defeat, was divided among the Great Powers and various successor
states.
Though the Union and Progress Party lacked any consistent ideology,
it gave a new impetus to the efforts for the westernization of the
society, especially in the realm of bureaucratic reform.[] The roots
of many of the reforms realized by Ataturk can also be traced back
to the time of Union and Progress. Aside from the proclamation of
the constitution, the development of Turkish nationalism, the
formation of political parties and the emergence of secular
organizations were among the piecemeal reforms of the Union and
Progress.[]
2. Toward A Secular
State: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
If the Union and Progress Party helped produce the eventual collapse
of the Ottoman Empire, it also was responsible for the emergence of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Mustafa Kemal, who had already become a
famous general through his defense of the eastern and western fronts
of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, led a rebellion
against the invasion of Anatolia by the Greeks, a move planned by
the western powers to enforce the partition of the Empire after the
Armistice of Mudros (30 October, 1918).
Since he was also a graduate of the military school (Harbiye) in
which all the ideas of the French Revolution prevailed, it is easy
to understand his seeing himself as the savior of the Empire. He
wrote, of himself, in one of his letters, as early as 1914, that “he
is ambitious, but his ambitions are very great and ... he is looking
for the realization of a great idea for the satisfaction of his
ambitions.”[]
Like all the Ottoman intellectuals in his generation he was also
brought up on the revolutionary ideas of the Young Ottomans. He was
a great believer in constitutional government and the basic human
rights and freedoms. The failure of the Young Ottomans and of the
Party of Union and Progress convinced him that the only way to save
the Empire was a radical change in the political system along the
line of the western democracies. His words, “Freedom is my
character,” reflects his commitment to the modern state against the
absolutism of the Sultan-Caliph.
The invasion of Anatolia by the Greeks, who were backed by the
victorious Great Powers, gave Mustafa Kemal Pasa the very chance he
was looking for: to organize the nation against the political
establishment in order to come to power. Since the Sultan-Caliph had
been in collaboration with the allied forces, it wasn’t very
difficult for Mustafa Kemal to oust him after winning the war of
liberation which lasted for four long years.
The formation of a modern state started concomitantly with the
agonizing War of Independence. When Mustafa Kemal landed in Samsun
on May 19, 1919, a date which marks the beginning of the War of
National Independence, one of his first steps was to encourage the
organization of the local committees for national resistance. Those
committees at the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses then became the bases
for the grassroots organizations of the new State.
At the moment he started to organize the War of Independence, he had
already decided to proclaim the Republic eventually.[] Interestingly
enough, Mustafa Kemal mentioned cultural reforms, such as the reform
of the alphabet from Arabic to Latin and the abolition of the fez
and veil at the very interview in 1919, in which he dictated his
secret political ambitions. He kept those cultural and political
aims to himself till the final victory because the cultural,
economic and social structure which he utilized to fight against the
enemy, as well as against the Sultan-Caliph, was the very same
traditional structure which he had decided eventually to eliminate.
Any leak about his cultural and political ambitions would have
weakened the public support given to him as the commander in chief
and the political leader of the War of Liberation.
His general strategy was to work through the representative bodies
authorized by the local communities and to guide them toward two
aims: to get the military and political support at he grassroots
level and to create a source of political power against the
Sultan-Caliph whose power stemmed from religion and tradition. Thus
the merger of those local committees of national resistance under
the name of “The Defense of Rights” organizations at the Erzurum and
Sivas Congresses had already paved the way for the secular character
of the new state prior to the establishment of the Grand National
Assembly.
The opening of the Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920 marks a
new era in Turkish politics. From then on, the representatives of
the people became the sole source of political power. Since Mustafa
Kemal was in complete control of the Assembly as the commander in
chief and as a national hero, he was elected Chairman of the
Assembly, the virtual head of the new state. The proclamation of the
Republic signified that the first phase of the radical
socio-cultural change had been successfully completed. Since any
reform program geared toward the creation of a secular nation-state
could not possibly be realized in any Islamic society without
seizing political power, the proclamation of the Republic laid the
groundwork for further changes. At this point one should bear in
mind the fact that controlling the political power is a necessary
condition for such reforms, but not a sufficient one. Thus the
consistent philosophy behind the reforms and the execution and the
programs should be closely examined.
III. THE CRUX OF THE
INDUCED SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE: FROM RELIGIOUS DOGMATISM TO
POSITIVISM
Though the total political system was changed, the extent of the
social and economic transformation was quite limited during the
initial years of the Republic. The following lines will illustrate
the point:
The political developments in Turkey in the decade 1920-1930 appear
as monumental developments to an impressionistic observer. They are
monumental indeed if the rate of development is measured according
to the changes in political institutions. But if viewed from the
standpoint of structural differentiation and the action of social
groups, the second half of the nineteenth century, as well as the
period 1908 to 1930, do not appear to show a new stage of
development, but the culmination of a developmental stage which
began with Sultans Selim III and Mahmud II. The entire period from
1800 to 1945 was marked by the slow emergence of a “modern
bureaucracy, then of an intelligentsia, and the subsequent
transformation of both through the broadening of the bases of
recruitment, education, and politicization.[]
In such a relatively stagnant structure, the revolutionary cadres
used cultural and ideological factors to give impetus to political
change toward new socioeconomic and cultural frontiers.
Since Islam dominated all areas of social, political, cultural and
economic spheres of the Empire, not only as a religion, but also as
a way of living. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his friends attacked
religious dogmatism in order to launch a new socio-cultural reform
program Such an act was quite meaningful from the political point of
view too, as the ousted Sultan-Caliph and the old regime took their
legitimate political authority from Islamic institutions.
Attacking Islam as an obstacle to development was also in accordance
with a firm belief in western positivism.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was planning to use a popular approach as a
unifying force because Ottoman society was divided into two
different cultural worlds, namely the “palace” culture and the
“folk” culture. Such a division also served as a barrier to
communication between the rulers and the ruled. The situation is
best described in Mardin’s words:
Two different cultural worlds existed side by side in the Ottoman
Empire without much contact with one another. One of theses was the
world of partly orally transmitted literary traditions, the world of
folk-culture, of tales, epics and widely-read popular poetry. The
second, the world of “polite” culture, was separated from the first
by a virtual Chinese wall. In the rarefied atmosphere of this
so-called divan literature, the media of communication were
controlled by a relatively small group of Doctors of Islamic law (Ulema),
higher employees of ‘departments’ of the central administration
(Divan employees on Hacegan) and a few additional unattached ‘hommes
de lettres’. In general, most of the literati held some governmental
post. Thus strategic lines of communications were concentrated in
the governmental machine and, for all practical purposes,
‘communications’ meant the ability of state servants to please one
another with the literary productions and to keep the flow of
governmental ad judicial information running.[]
Ataturk’s reforms, among other things, aimed at solving this problem
of cultural duality.[] Actually the differentiation between the two
cultures became more salient after the efforts for westernization
had started in the Empire, since the newly established institutions,
especially the educational ones, broadened the gap between the
masses and the intelligentsia. Thus the alienation of the people
reached greater dimensions.
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s aim was to bridge the gap between the masses
and the intelligentsia. His belief in the sovereignty of the people
was the basic political principle he applied in his reform program.
Since he was against the mere imitation of western institutions, the
goals for building a new society were set as nationalism, a national
economy and a positive approach to life. He had great faith in
“scientific methods.”[] He thought that, as science, the
westernization of Turkish society through a positive approach would
ensure the universality of reforms.
Ataturk’s words “the best and the real guide in life is knowledge
and science,” which were carved on the walls of the Faculty of
Language. History and Geography in Ankara, reflect his positive
approach against religious dogmas. This slogan sets forth the
secular, nation-state ideal of the new Turkish Republic in
opposition to religion-based traditional Ottoman Empire.
IV. BUILDING A NEW SOCIETY:
THE REFORMS OF ATATÜRK
The Turkish Revolution consisted of two successive and intermingled
parts: The War of National Liberation (or independence) and the
Reforms of Ataturk. Since he started to build a new political and
social structure during the War of Liberation, his later reforms
which were then symbolized as “six arrows” should be studied as
meaningful parts of a functional unity, namely the Turkish
Revolution.
1. Main Principles of the
Ataturk Revolution: Anti-Imperialism and Westernism. The Two Pillars
of National Independence
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk assumed political power through a War of
Liberation against the victorious powers of the First World War.
Thus his anti-imperialism was the outcome of his military actions.
But to view his stand against imperialism only as military
phenomenon would be a great fallacy. As a member of the Ottoman
intelligentsia, he believed that the final collapse of the Empire
had been due to economic, political, and military exploitation by
the West. Thus, his firm stand for “unconditional and total
independence” was something much more than a military view. As
Ataturk once stated.:
Gentlemen, when history applies itself to searching the causes of
the grandeur and the decadence of a people, it invokes political,
military, and social reasons. It is evident that ultimately all the
reasons spring from social conditions but that which is in closest
bearing to the existence, the prosperity and the decadence of a
people, is its economics. This historical truth is confirmed in our
existence and our national history. In fact, if one examines the
history of the Turkish people, one will see that her grandeur and
her decadence are merely corollaries of her economic life.[]
When such words are supported by his summation that “The new Turkish
state will not be a military state, but an economic state,” the
anti-imperialist nature of the Turkish Revolution can be better
understood. both speeches were given prior to the proclamation of
the Republic, but after the War of Liberation was completed. Thus,
the economic content of “total independence” cannot possibly be
overlooked in his actions.
Interestingly enough, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s anti-imperialist views
were based on his concept of western civilization. In other words,
he knew that the only way to become a western society was to be free
from western economic and political exploitation. I think the
difference between his revolutionary movement and the prior attempts
to “save the Empire” lies at this very point: Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
aimed at creating a western society, whereas the westernist
movements prior to his time were geared to imitating western
societies. Those attempts were marked by the importation of western
educational institutions while Mustafa Kemal imported the whole
ideology and political structure of the West, including “national
sovereignty an national independence.”
2. The Social and
Cultural Reforms: Imposition of a New Way of Life
Kemalism was considered an anti-religious ideology but in fact it
had nothing against the Islamic religion except to deny religion as
a source of political power. Although this may sound like an
innocent statement today, it was then a most serious attack against
the Islamic religion which had sprung from a systematic set of
principles regulating political power as well.[] Kemalism was
regarded as an infidel ideology by some religious leaders who had
lost their status in infidel ideology by some religious leaders who
had lost their status in the change of the power structure in
Turkey. Another rationale behind his being called an infidel was his
firm stand against the caliphate and sultanate as politico-religious
posts. He thought that they should be abolished in the course of the
establishment of a secular nation-state.
Since the last Sultan-Caliph had been in collaboration with the
Entente Powers during the invasion of Anatolia and had taken drastic
actions against the Nationalists (Kemalists) in Anatolia, Mustafa
Kemal as the victorious leader of the national resistance, was in
quite an advantageous position vis-a-vis the Sultan. moreover, since
the Ankara republican government had negotiated the Treaty of
Lausanne on July 24, 1923 with the western governments, the very
existence of the Istanbul government of the Sultan had become an
anachronism.
Thus, the most difficult reform, namely the elimination of the
Sultanate, was realized in the name of “national sovereignty” during
a lull in peace talks in Lausanne on November 1, 1922, following a
ruling of the Grand National Assembly about the replacement of the
Ottoman Empire by the new Turkish Sate on October 30, 1922. The
proclamation of the Republic became the next necessary step in the
process o political reform even though some of Mustafa Kemal’s
closest friends opposed the idea.[] However, it was carried through
on October 29, 1923. As Mustafa Kemal Ataturk decided to impose a
western style of life on the society, the remnants of the old
regime, especially the political ones which were intermingle with
the religious dogmas, had to be swept away to pave the way for the
new structure. The Caliphate was abolished within this context.
One should remember that the Islamic political system had been
dominant for centuries: thus, eliminating the Caliphate was a more
difficult task than the proclamation of the Republic. There was
strong opposition to such an act even in the Grand National
Assembly. Actually when the Grand National Assembly appointed
Abdulmecid Efendi (son of Abdulaziz) as Caliph to replace the
runaway Sultan-Caliph, Vahdettin, an opposition front was formed on
the grounds that the Grand National Assembly did not have the
authority to appoint a religious leader.[] Nevertheless, the Grand
National Assembly first appointed him as Caliph of the Muslim
community on November 18, 1922, and then on March 3, 1924 abolished
the Caliphate on the grounds that the Caliph had breached the law by
attempting to revitalize the Caliphate as a political post.
It is interesting to note that six consecutive reforms concerning
religion, military organization and education were executed on the
same day of March 3, 1924, after Mustafa Kemal had conferred with
military commanders in Izmir. Those reforms were the abolition of
the Caliphate, the termination of the religious educational system,
the unification of education in secular schools, the closing of the
Ministry of Canon Law, the abolition of the Ministry of the General
Staff and the establishment of the General Directorate of Religious
Affairs.
In keeping with republican theory the military and the religious
cadres were now placed under civilian control. Symbolically, with
the removal of the Ministry of the General Staff, any opposition to
the abolition of the Ministry of Canon Law could be countered by
indicating that even the General Staff which had led the War of
National Independence was placed a civilian control. Actually,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had been against any military interference in
politics since the time of the Young Turk Period and this issue was
one of the chief points of conflict between him and the Union and
Progress Party.
The reorganization of education was to become one of the main
elements for the secularization of culture. This change took place
at the same time but without any opposition at all. The reform of
headgear, set in motion by a law passed on November 25, 1925, was
designed to change the appearance of the people as well as to give a
sense of cultural symbol. In some areas of daily life, integration
with the modern world and the reformist movement entailed the use of
the western European calendar and methods of keeping time. On
December 26th, 1925, the old lunar calendar and the old method of
calculating time were changed and the day of rest moved from Friday
to Sunday.
One of the most important cultural reforms was the change of the
alphabet from Arabic to Latin letters. This drastic change not only
facilitated the increase in literacy, but also served to strengthen
the image of the secular nation-state. By changing the alphabet from
the Arabic script of the Holy Quran to the Latin script, Turkish
language and culture were emancipated from the influences of the
Arabic script and Islamic culture.
In the meantime, the legal structure was secularized. Parallel to
the abolition of the Ministry of Canon Law and Pious Foundations,
the new Turkish civil code, which was an adaptation of the Swiss
civil code, was put into effect on October 4, 1926. The new penal
code, commercial code and the law of contracts also came into force
the same day as meaningful parts of the legal code. The
secularization of the Constitution and reforms such as the
assumption of family names, and the abolition of religious titles,
followed as a logical sequence. The general method of bringing about
socio-cultural change in Turkey obviously required some political
force by the victorious nationalist-revolutionaries. Also the
integration of those reforms into a consistent ideology with the aid
of organizational mechanisms was not neglected.
3. “Six Arrows”: An
Attempt to Create a Consistent Ideology
The whole decade of the 1920’s was marked by reformist legal actions
which were geared toward the reorganization of the total political
and socio-cultural structure of the new Republic. In the early
thirties, while the world was under the pressures of the “Great
Recession” of 1929, the Turkish Revolution seemed to reach a plateau
with a deadly threat of stagnation. Thus, Ataturk decided to
establish a “loyal opposition” to give a political dynamism to the
ongoing Turkish Revolution. Though the Party was formed through the
backing of Ataturk and his friends,[] the support for it by the
reactionaries became uncontrollable and turned out to be a real
threat to the social-cultural and political reforms which were still
in their period of infancy. As a result of this unexpected and
unwanted development, the party was closed three months after its
foundation, and Ataturk decided to revitalize the revolutionary
spirit of the Republican People’s Party through ideological and
educational programs.
Since the Kemalist ideology had not been articulated as a compact
school of thought in the beginning, the only group which emerged
with the function of mobilizing the intelligentsia (rather than the
masses) was a number of writers organized around the political
monthly Kadro.[] Kadro tried to develop an ideology for the Kemalist
revolution. Their main orientation was later formulated as the
“center-periphery relations” regarding the world economic system by
thinkers such as Maurice Dobb, Immanuel Wallerstein, Arghiri
Emmanuel and others. They believed that the main contradiction lay
with the developed and underdeveloped nations rather than among
classes in the same society. In addition to their quasi-Marxist
approach to the world economic and political system, the group
around Kadro tried to create an “enthusiasm” for the Turkish
Revolution by bringing psychological and socio-psychological factors
to the fore.[]
In the thirties, the world was witnessing the rise of fascism and
the institutionalization of communism, and the newly emerged Turkish
Republic was under the ideological impact of both political systems.
Though Kadro was quasi-Marxist, the higher officials of the
Republican People’s Party were rightist-oriented authoritarians.
Among the writers of Kadro, there were Republican People’s Party
deputies and some close friends of Ataturk. Thus Kadro’s power came
from informal relations with Ataturk and Inonu, the two leaders of
the Revolution. But the officials of the Party were more powerful
than Kadro, because they were the official representatives of the
establishment that had actually been created and controlled by
Ataturk and Inonu.
Kadro was at first supported and then tolerated by both Ataturk and
Inonu against the party organization just to create a challenge to
the bureaucracy which was intermingled with the Party. When the
issue boiled down to a real ideological controversy between the
ranks of the Party and the writers of Kadro, however, Ataturk and
Inonu favored the organizational setup and the group around Kadro
was dissolved. The formulation of the Turkish revolution in
ideological terms was in a sense “forced” by the above-noted
internal and external factors.
The six principles, symbolized as the “six arrows” in the party
flag, were pronounced as the ideology of “Kemalizm” in the Fourth
Congress of the Republican People’s Party in 1935. The six
principles, although stated at different times, formed an integrated
whole since each principle had its own characteristics but became
meaningful in conjunction with the others. Those principles which
can be considered the pillars of the new State, were nationalism,
republicanism, secularism, populism, etatism and reformism or
revolutionism.
Nationalism
Turkish nationalism had been the most retarded nationalist movement
in the Ottoman Empire and had only emerged at the time of the Union
and Progress Party, almost after the Empire had been dissolved. The
champion of Turkish nationalism was Ziya Gokalp, a pioneer in
sociology and the “ideologue” for the Union and Progress faction. In
his way of expressing it, “Turkism could be strengthened by filling
the patterns of western civilization with Turkish Culture.”[]
Gokalp had systematically advocated domination of Turkish culture
with forms of western civilization rather than importing
institutions as they had developed in the west. His sociological
orientation, taking a nation as a political and cultural unity,
helped him his advocacy of Turkism on “scientific” grounds. Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk’s movement and Ziya Gokalp’s ideas had a close
interaction in that Kemalism was affected by Ziya Gokalp in the
formulation of nationalism as a principle, and Ziya Gokalp was
affected by Kemalism which rejected any ambition beyond the borders
of the new Turkey. There was a revision of the Pan-Turanism of Ziya
Gokalp in the light of the Kemalist revolution. Ataturk knew only
too well that the new Turkish Republic needed cultural traits for a
new society because he had denied the Ottoman cultural heritage.
Towards the end of his life, he placed special emphasis on Turkish
language and history. He tried to reinforce Turkish nationalism by
eliminating the cultural duality and emphasizing the historical
roots of the Turks as a nation.
Ataturk’s nationalism was not based on race or religion. On the
contrary, the main orientation was political and the “Turk” was
defined as “anybody who lives within the borders of the Turkish
Republic.” Thus, religious minorities such as Jews, Armenians and
Greeks were given equal rights with the Muslim Turks, and more
importantly, really treated equally (if not privileged) by the new
Republican administration which denied the religious approach of the
Ottoman bureaucracy. In this sense, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s
nationalism was not segregative, but integrative.[]
Republicanism
Since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had to put an end to the Ottoman dynasty
which had blocked his path toward a contemporary political
structure. Republicanism seemed to be the only solution for that
time. Actually, nationalism and republicanism supplemented each
other with the backing of populism and secularism. The Empire was
non-existent, the religious-political head and symbol of that Empire
had lost his functions and the new society did not need a
Sultan-Caliph under whom the Muslim communities would be
integrated.[] Republicanism was also instrumental in laying the
necessary theoretical foundations for the establishment of democracy
in the future. There is no doubt that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk meant
the achievement of a democratic structure for the future, as he
openly stated that a republican regime means the administration of
the State through a democratic system. “We established the Republic,
and now as it reaches its tenth year of age, all the necessary
conditions for a democracy ought to be realized one by one when the
time comes.”[] The principle of republicanism gained some social
content when coupled with populism, another one of the “six arrows,”
as it was the functional idea for the foundation of a nation-state,
hand in hand with nationalism.
Secularism
Secularism was the political, legal and socio-cultural principle
which was complementary to the concept of a modern sate. Like all
the principles of Kemalism, it had developed as a reaction to the
Ottoman system. It meant the separation of religion from legal,
educational and cultural life. Almost all the important reforms were
based on this principle: the unification of education, the adoption
of the new civil code, the abolition of the Caliphate, and other
changes.
Because of the influence of secularism on all Kemalist reforms, the
“evolutionary cadres of the new republic were accused of being
anti-religious. The new revolutionaries wanted to change the six
hundred year old Islamic traditions that had affected the social,
cultural and political spheres of the Ottoman Empire. Fierce
opposition was expected and the religious leaders and the
revolutionaries became rival parties in terms of status and power in
the society.
As the traditional forces in the Ottoman Empire allied with
religious functionaries against any kind of effort towards a modern
state, secularism was also a means of eliminating traditional
obstacles to modernization. Far from being anti-religious in
principle, by separating religion from other facets, secularism save
Islam from being crushed by the Kemalist reformation in the
reorganization process of Turkish society.
Although Mustafa Kemal had used religion and religious leaders at
times, he apparently held no strong belief himself. “... Ataturk and
his colleagues have not instituted anti-religious measures of
sentiments, as have dictatorships of Russia and Germany. While they
have not displayed anti-religious attitudes, it is probably correct
to say that they have no love for hidebound ecclesiastics and
ecclesiasticism.”[] Ataturk could not afford to sacrifice religion
in his role as a political reformer. The following observation sums
up the Kemalist behavior on this subject: “... It is plain that one
cannot categorically assert either that the government (of the new
Republic) is favorable or that it is hostile to Islam. The truth of
the matter seems to be that it is distinctly opportunistic in its
attitude: that it is favorable to whatever in Islam is consistent
with the republican ideals, relentlessly opposed to anything which
might endanger Kemalist success, and, for the rest, more or less
neutral.”[]
It should also be remembered that secularism was used as a
theoretical base for the transfer of political power from the
religious-traditional post of the Sultan-Caliph to the republican
post of the President.
Populism
Populism was only a social approach geared to eliminate cultural
dualism, but also a political principle which was to deny class
differentiation. The Party program read as follows on this subject:
We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before
law, and who recognize no privileges for any individual, family,
class or community, to be of the people and for the people
(populist),
It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the
Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a
community divided into various professions according to the
requirements of the division of labor for the individual and the
social life of the Turkish people....
The aims of our Party, with this principle, are to secure social
order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish
harmony of interest. The benefits are to be proportionate to the
aptitude and to the amount of work.[]
The social policy of the new republic was rather a “solidarist” one,
and aligned specifically neither with capitalism nor socialism.
Populism in this sense was not only a symbol for social policy but
also a guide to economic activities. In fact, Ataturk identified
populism with the national economic policy.[]
All the reforms were the products of the intelligentsia or the
ruling class in the young republic as there was no other social
force in existence. Regarded as such, populism was also an elitist
approach to the society and etatism, which was based on populism as
well as nationalism, resulted in the development of capitalism.
Etatism
Etatism was a means of building a national economy based on private
enterprise, through the protection and support of the state, and in
some instances, its direct intervention in the form of “State
Economic Enterprises.”
As a Kemalist principle, etatism was instrumental in the creation of
an independent economy rather than a state-controlled one. A
Communist economy was never a goal of Kemalism. Etatism was a
principle necessary to complete the economic part of the
socio-political transformation of the Ottoman society into a modern
state. It accelerated the economic processes that the West had
experienced during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[]
It was stated that ... “the theory of solidarism, which developed in
nineteenth-century Europe as a reaction to both classical liberalism
and Marxism, had a profound impact on the Kemalist principle of
populism. but because the theory of solidarism was not an adequately
developed social theory, it did not provide the necessary guidance
for socio-economic transformation.”[] Etatism was the principle
which filled this gap in the Turkish transformation.
Reformism (Revolutionism)
Reformism (revolutionism) also lent its nature to the other five
principles. It had two fundamental meanings: 1) the reforms which
had been achieved through the revolutionary cadres of the new
republic should be preserved; 2) the spirit of reformism (revolutionism)
should dominate the future of Turkish society. Mustafa Kemal was a
realistic and pragmatic leader. He knew only too well that drastic
changes and reforms, achieved in such a short period of time, would
need a longer period for assimilation. Reformism (revolutionism)
stated as the sixth principle would become the revolutionary spirit
that should continue through time to aid this absorption. He also
believed that the re-structuring of society could be achieved
through new reforms to be added to the ones already introduced.
Perhaps his very strong reliance on Turkish youth as a major force
to carry on with his reforms sprang room this belief. It was an
indispensable principle for Kemalism, which in itself was a reaction
to the old structure, and could be erased overnight. Thus, reformism
(revolutionism) can be viewed as the mainspring of the new cultural
synthesis sought for the young Republic.
4. Organizational
Mechanisms for the Ideological Re-orientation of the Society
What Mustafa Kemal had sought in the realm of culture for the new
state could be expressed as an “induced acculturation” in social
anthropological terms: all this political, social, educational and
cultural reforms were geared to introducing a contemporary western
culture into a traditional Islamic Turkish society. Since he was
deprived of the backing of any strong emergent class (such as the
bourgeoisie in the French Revolution or the party of the proletariat
in the Russian Revolution), he had to build up a sound
organizational structure through which he could manage the society.
He also lacked any organizational support as he had already broken
his ties with the Party of Union and Progress. Thus, he had to start
from the grass-roots level.
The leverage points were the “Defense of Rights” organizations which
had started after the invasion of Anatolia by the Greeks, urged on
by the victorious powers of the First World War. The merger of those
local resistance organizations under the name of “The Association
for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (Thrace)” was
realized in the Sivas Congress on September 7, 1919, and Mustafa
Kemal was elected as the permanent chairman of the steering
committee.
When the Grand National Assembly was inaugurated on April 23, 1920,
after the Ottoman Parliament was dissolved by the occupying powers,
Mustafa Kemal, being the elected chairman of the assembly, started
to control the whole governmental apparatus.
Although such a legitimate source of power and the control of the
channels of communication seem sufficient for political and military
domination over a society, it is evident that the acculturation
process needed some additional and more subtle mechanism. Mustafa
Kemal made use of three such mechanisms: the Republican Party, “the
People’s Houses” (Halkevleri) and two autonomous research
associations, the Turkish History Society and the Turkish Language
Society. later he added a fourth one, the universities.
The Party
The formation of a Party was a necessary step for Mustafa Kemal, as
he was trying to establish a modern state which could not possibly
function without such a political organization. Actually, a
party-like group called the “Association for the Defense of Rights
of Anatolia and Rumelia” was formed in the first Grand National
Assembly out of political necessity. Mustafa Kemal needed a formal
organization to exert his revolutionary control over the Assembly,
which was composed of various groups from Istanbul and from
Anatolia. The second goal for the formation of such a “group” was to
start building a new constitutional structure for the new state.[]
After the elections were held for the Second National Assembly, the
Association for the Defense of Rights was changed into the
Republican People’s Party on September 9, 1923. Mustafa Kemal had
declared nine principles under the heading of the “Program of
Populism” five months previously, in order to present a coherent
program to the public prior to the elections. Among those principles
were national sovereignty, the irrevocable character of the
abolition of the Sultanate, the abolition of some taxes, and the
restructuring of the legal system according to secular principles.
Ataturk planned to use the Republican Party for two different
purposes at two different levels. First, he made use of it as an
instrument for his legitimate power, based on national
representation. Secondly, the party became a sort of “school for the
education of the Turkish people.” Thus, the party was different from
classical political parties, in the sense that it was the channel
“from the top to the bottom” of the social order regarding new
reforms and also a mechanism of “popular representation.” Not only
was the formulation of the “Kemalist ideology” realized within the
party, but also mass education concerning a new culture and a new
political structure was performed through the party organization.
The People’s Houses
Since the Party was mostly of a political nature, the acculturation
process required widespread dissemination of new cultural values
which needed some additional mechanisms. Such necessity cannot be
overemphasized in the face of the inert character of the rural
masses conditioned for centuries by the religious structure of the
political system.
The people’s houses were formed by the Republican People’s Party as
an “institution to provide the national organization of the society
in the area of culture.”[] “Strengthening the national conscience”
was among the stated aims of the people’s houses.[] The people’s
houses had nine branches of activity which sought to cover all the
cultural life of the society: 1) Language and literature, 2) Fine
Arts, 3) Libraries and Publications, 8) Rural Development (Koyculuk),
9) History and Museums.[]
As can be seen clearly from the above noted divisions, the people’s
houses were designed to “mobilize people” according to the new
cultural aims as well as to launch a “community development” program
on a national scale. Especially, activities such as “social
assistance” and “rural development” (koyculuk) at a national level
allow one to assert that the people’s houses were the first attempts
at “community development” which later became universal through the
programs of the United Nations. It should also be noted that a
nation-wide education program was started through the same
organizational setup. Later on, such educational activities were
followed by a new educational experience based on “learning through
doing! in the villages, under the name of “village institutes.”
People’s houses and later on, village institutes, became places also
wherein the folklore of the local communities were studied and
developed by works of art and socio-cultural monographs. The
cultural and ideological activities of the people’s houses and
people’s rooms (small branches of the people’s houses) were under
the watchful eye of the Republican People’s Party. Though everybody
could participate in the activities, only party members could be
elected to administrative posts.
In 1945, when their activities peaked, the number of people’s houses
reached four hundred thirty-five: and the number of people’s rooms,
two thousand seven hundred eighteen. The figures for their
activities were really impressive in terms of the number of
participants. The activities of 1940 were reported as more than five
thousand conferences, two thousand theater performances, one
thousand two hundred concerts (classical music), two thousand film
showings, about two thousand “family entertainments,” some two
thousand villages, more than forty-thousand cases of social
assistance, one hundred and fifty exhibitions of fine arts, four
hundred other exhibitions, various public education courses attended
by 40,000 persons and more than two million readers of four hundred
thousand books in public libraries.
The Turkish History
Society and the Turkish Language Society
It was early understood by the party leaders that the ideology of
Kemalism should be supported through scientific research on Turkish
nationalism. The roots of Turkish culture were to be brought to the
fore from the darkness of the past where they had been overshadowed
since the seventh century by the magnificent Islamic culture. Thus
studies on Turkish history and on Turkish language were given
special emphasis by the revolutionary cadres of the new Republic,
and personally by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk himself. Efforts in both
historical and philological research were especially geared to
freeing the new society from an Ottoman cultural heritage which had
imposed Arabic and even Persian cultures on the people of Anatolia.
Historical research went for back even to the time of the Hittites
in Asia Minor and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia.
It was also contended that a new culture requires a new language.
After the reform of the alphabet in 1928, the studies were started
to “purify” the Turkish language from Arabic and Persian. Actually
it was an effort to abandon the cosmopolitan language of the
Ottomans, which had been spoken and written mostly by a “palace
culture”, and to substitute the everyday language of the “people” of
the Turkish Republic. Coupled with the legal alphabet reform, the
reform of the Turkish Language became not only a cultural, but also
a political, symbol of the struggle of Turkish nationalism against
Ottoman-style culture.
Ataturk was a keen enough revolutionary to realize the shortcomings
of imposing new ideas by force. He thus formed two independent and
autonomous organizations to study Turkish history and Turkish
Language on April 10, 1931 and July 12, 1932 respectively. The
cultural mobilization went forward methodically with the
inauguration of the first “people’s house” on February 19, 1932 and
the university reform, on November 18, 1933. While the new ideology
was formulated within the Party and by the Societies of Turkish
History and Turkish Language, the People’s Houses were used as the
channels through which this ideology was transferred to the masses.
The ultimate aim was to create an original and independent culture
for the Turkish Republic. Mustafa Kemal and his followers sought to
amalgamate the Western, Islamic and Turkish civilizations by
imposing Western models upon traditional Islamic culture to create
the new Turkish civilization.
The Role of the
Universities
The higher educational institutions have always been on the
progressive side in Turkey since 1863, the date when the first
university in the modern sense opened. As soon as it started to
train students along modern secular lines, the reactionary religious
people successfully intervened and forced the closing of the first
Dar-ul-Funun (the house of sciences). Thereafter, the professors
were exiled. It was reopened during the oppressive reign of Sultan
Abdulhamid II in order to be used as a source of support for the
throne.
With the proclamation of the Republic, Istanbul University which had
already been reformed in 1919, was given new facilities and in 1924
legally reorganized along the lines of a modern institution. On that
date, the famous pedagogue, Ismayil Hakki Baltacioglu was appointed
President.
Nevertheless, the expected dynamic support from revolutionary cadres
of the new Republic was not immediately available in the University
community, thus making it dysfunctional for the revolution in the
early years of the Republic. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, being a great
believer in a secular, positive approach to the arts and sciences,
supported Istanbul University and established a new one in Ankara.
Istanbul University, housed in a new structure, reopened on November
18, 1933. The 1930’s were the years of the rise of
National-Socialists in Germany. Thus many university professors,
seeking asylum from Hitler’s regime, came upon Ataturk’s invitation
and helped contribute to the development of scientific knowledge in
the areas of law, finance, sociology, and medicine. In 1936 the
Faculty of Language, History and Geography was opened in Ankara.
Thereafter the scientific contribution to the cultural revival of
the young Republic was also carried out there. The universities, in
their role as autonomous organizations of research and teaching,
developed the social sciences and humanities in Turkey placing
Turkish cultural identity on a sound basis. Such an achievement was
brought abut through the autonomous structure of the universities
which is still protected carefully by the academic community against
pressures to place them under political control. Such a change would
certainly hinder scientific objectivity. While here we have singled
out two institutions, such as the Academy of Fine Arts in Istanbul
and the State Conservatory in Ankara, contributed their share to the
development of Turkish art and culture.
5. Sociological Appraisal
Having seen that the revolution and the subsequent reforms were
realized through the systematic efforts of a group of the ruling
elite of the Ottoman Empire, we realize that Ataturk was not the
leader of a rising socio-economic class but rather the leader of a
statist-elitist group formed by the civilian and military
bureaucracy of the Empire who had worked out an alliance with some
of the landowners during the War of Independence.
As the new elite was a product of the Ottoman system, class
development in the Republic was hindered. Because of this historical
and sociological fact, the Turkish Revolution produced a political
change at its outset.[] Deprived of the support of a rising class in
society, Ataturk was hindered in his goals and had to introduce
socio-economic and cultural changes through his political power.
The reforms were designed to create a western-type society in the
absence of a powerful capitalist class to support it, and thus, in a
sense, the reforms were designed to create such a class. An alliance
between the ruling elite and the weak intermediary classes of
landowners and entrepreneurial groups was instigated by the
revolutionary cadres. This strategy resulted in the cooperation
between the bureaucracy of the Republic and the local notables such
as landowners, tradesmen and other sections of the hereditary
intermediary classes of the Ottomans.[]
Legal, educational, and cultural reforms, in addition to political
ones, were used as a means of accelerating socio-economic and
cultural progress along the lines the western world had followed a
century before. Thus, in sociological terms, Ataturk’s reforms were
not the natural result of socio-economic and cultural changes, but
ideological positions imposed to induce such changes. In other
words, the Turkish Revolution is an example of infrastructural
changes through superstructural means. By using the power of the
State, Ataturk created a new socio-economic and cultural order.
however, this movement was so alien to the existing socio-economic
structure of the Ottomans that it did not even have philosophers,
thinkers and writers.[] Ziya Gokalp, the only theoretician of the
Party of Union and Progress, was limited in his influence, as his
approach to the revolution was too general to have a deep impact on
the Republic.
There is no doubt that Ataturk’s revolution was an anti-imperialist
one, but it had fought with the very weapons developed by the West.
Westernization became the response to the imperialism of the West.
As the reforms had to achieve rapid westernization, the principles
of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, etatism, and
reformism (revolutionism) were chosen as the accelerators in order
to attain the socio-economic characteristics of western countries in
one tenth of the time actually taken by Europe.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL
THOUGHT
There are two critical points in Turkish history: the first as the
acceptance of the Islamic religion during the Ninth Century; the
second was the Ataturk Revolution in the Twentieth Century.
During the eleven intervening centuries, the Islamic religion
dominated social thought in public and private life. Thus, the
evolution in Turkish history prior to the French Revolution could be
viewed as developing out of the political strife amongst Muslim
leaders, tribes and states or their interaction with similar
entities in the “infidel” world. Starting from the date of the
French Revolution, “liberal schools of thought mitigated the
absolutist heritage of the Ottomans and also attempted to reform the
distorted and corrupted beliefs of Islam which were considered the
“moral” base of the Ottoman State.
1. General Aspects of
Social Thought
The differences of thought which became evident in the form of sects
had started long before the Turks became Muslims. Then came the
impact of the Greek philosophers. Medieval Islamic philosophers
interpreted Islamic thought in accordance with the terminology and
norms of Plato and Aristotle. at this stage Islamic and western
political thought were on the same philosophical footing. This
foundation in western thought eventually led to the flowering of
western philosophy and science at the expense of theology during the
renaissance and the Enlightenment. In the Ottoman Empire, by
contrast, dogmatic thinkers ensured that theology would dominate
philosophy and science until well into the Nineteenth Century.
2. Interaction with the
West Prior to the French Revolution
In the previous analysis one should not overlook the interaction
between Islamic dogmatism and the power of the state. When the
Ottoman State was at the peak of its power, in the areas of material
development and technological innovations, the seeds of dogmatism
were implanted into the society through a powerful central
bureaucracy which could control social life and ideology. In fact,
the more the state lost its economic power, the more it exerted
control on ideology. Eventually the salvation of the state was
sought in the realm of political thought. Thus the impact of the
French Revolution became a real factor of change after the
Eighteenth Century.
Nevertheless, there had always been a western impact in the Empire
before the French Revolution. Actually a synthesis between the East
and the West might have taken place after Mehmet the Conqueror
seized Istanbul in 1453 and put an end to the Byzantine Empire. His
historic mission was to revive Islamic civilization and to reunite
the Roman Empire. He achieved the first goal but fell short of
realizing the second.[]
The fall of Istanbul to the Ottomans gave to the Islamic world
another opportunity to establish a sound interaction with the West.
The Ottomans obviously missed the chance as the Austrian Imperial
Ambassador Busbecq wrote in 1560:
No nation in the world has shown greater readiness than the Turks to
avail themselves of the useful inventions of the foreigners as is
proved by their employment of cannons and mortars, and many other
things invented by Christians. They cannot, however, be induced as
yet to use printing, or to establish public clocks, because they
think that the Scriptures, that is their sacred books-would no
longer be scriptures if they were printed, and that, if public
clocks were introduced, the authority of their muezzins and their
ancient rites would be thereby impaired.[]
Such selective interaction with the West thus resulted in a
catastrophic dogmatism which not only halted the domestic
development of sciences but also shut out the positive elements of
the West. In the eighteenth century, the Sheikh ul-Islam Ebu Ishak
Ismail Efendi (highest religious official) ruled that the books on
philosophy, history and astronomy, found in the library of Grand
Vizier, Damat Ali Pasa, should not be presented to the public
libraries.[]
Professor Lewis aptly summarizes the problem of technological and
ideological interactions before the French Revolution in this way:
It may at first sight seem strange that Islamic civilization, which
in its earlier stages was so receptive to influences from Hellenism
and Iran, even from India and China, nevertheless decisively
rejected the West. But an explanation is not hard to find. When
Islam was still expanding and receptive, the Christian West had
little or nothing to offer, but rather flattered Islamic pride with
a spectacle of a culture that it was Christian, it was discredited
in advance. The Muslim doctrine of successive revelations,
culminating in the final mission of Muhammad, enabled the Muslim to
reject Christianity as an earlier and imperfect form of something
which he alone possessed in its entirety and to discount Christian
thought and Christian civilization.[]
These words revealing the lack of interaction between the two
civilizations explain clearly how the Ottomans could reinforce their
isolation from Western thought through a despotic oriented state and
the ideological support of Islamic institutions.
3. The Impact of the
French Revolution
The influence of the French Revolution upon the destiny of the
Ottomans, an impact which is still relevant in the Turkish Republic,
cannot be overemphasized. The results of such an impact may be
considered under five headings.
First of all, by introducing new notions such as liberty, equality
and nationality, the French Revolution induced a cultural change
which influenced poets and writers. Such a cultural change laid the
foundations of the Kemalist Revolution in the 1920’s through the
development of young Ottoman thought in the mid-nineteenth century
and the social changes of the Young Turks prior to and during World
War I.
Second, by providing a philosophical rationale for dissenters in the
Ottoman system, the French Revolution gave birth to liberal and
constitutional movements against Ottoman absolutism in the political
sphere. This political impact was restricted at first to
intellectual circles but when supported and strengthened by cultural
change, became powerful enough to emerge as a political alternative
to the absolute rule of the Sultan-Caliph.
A third important result of the impact of the French Revolution was
its generation of widespread nationalist movements among the various
millets, especially among the Orthodox communities in the Balkans
which had become prosperous through their privileged economic
position in Ottoman society. The following observations by Stanford
Shaw illustrate the point quite clearly:
Greek ethnic feeling, long preserved in the Orthodox millet, also
had profound expression through the successes of the wealthy
Phanariote Greeks of Istanbul who had attained significant political
and financial power in the empire. The Treaty of Karlowitz (1699)
also had made possible a renewal of Ottoman trade relations with
Austria and the rest of the Habsburg Empire, with Greece becoming a
prosperous middleman for much of the trade of the Mediterranean with
Central Europe. The Ottoman treaties with Russia in 17774 and 1794
not only opened the Straits to the commercial ships of Russia and
Austria but also specified that the sultan’s Greek subjects would be
allowed to sail their own ships under the protection of the Russian
flag.[]
Shaw further indicates how Greek merchants gained much of the
coasting trade of Europe during the Napoleonic Wars. Thus a small
Greek middle class with considerable economic power emerged. This
class in turn absorbed the European ideas of Nationalism and the
revolution as a means of achieving Greek independence. Needless to
say such national movements coupled with economic privileges
hastened the final collapse of the Ottoman state.
The fourth consequence of the French Revolution led to increased
efforts of the Great Powers (Russia, Austria, Britain and France) to
control Ottoman politics as well as the Ottoman economy.
Interference in Ottoman politics by the traditional Great Powers
eventually led the Ottomans into World War I under German influence.
European powers sought leverage over the Orthodox minorities as well
as other Balkan and Arab communities. Russia, for example, at first
supported its “brother,” Orthodox religious communities in the
Balkans but was thwarted by Bismarck after the Russo-Ottoman war of
1877-78 in a move to establish hegemony over Bulgaria. She next gave
succor to the nascent Armenian national movement on Ottoman
territory, but notably not within the Russian Caucasus.[]
The fifth result of the French Revolution was the reformist attempts
of the Ottoman Palace. Among them were the abolition of the
Yeniceris (Janissaries), the opening of new schools, the change of
dress to European styles and many legal and political reforms which
followed the program of the Tanzimat, an official era of reform.
Actually the Tanzimat Era was the result of efforts at
westernization, rather than a starting point for a movement of
westernization, but it was taken by many writers as the point of
departure through which the influence of western culture irrevocably
affected Ottoman society.
The reformist efforts, imitating western institutions, enlarged the
gap between the intelligentsia and the masses since such attempts,
regardless of their failure, had undermined the already shaken
traditional socio-economic structure in which the people were
accustomed to function.[]
4. Introduction of
Political Ideas Through Cultural Means
The history of political struggles for freedom ad constitutional
government in the Ottoman Empire in the Nineteenth Century is the
history of newspapers, journals and literature, in the sense that
they were either directly attached to political organizations, or
written and published by the people who were fighting for political
ideals.
The western ideals of freedom, justice, equality, constitutional
government and the like, were presented to the Ottoman public
concomitantly with the simplification of the Turkish language and
even restructuring of Turkish grammar through a novelty in
communications, namely, newspapers.
In this process of modernization not only in the presentation of
“new schools of thought” but also the introduction of new ways of
communication, Ibrahim Sinasi Efendi played a pioneering role.[]
Though Ibrahim Sinasi is little known to western European or
American students of cultural history, he played a pivotal role
among the literati of the Ottoman Empire. Previously they had
developed their literary skills for a small circle of the elite.
Sinasi showed them how their talents might be directed to educating
a larger Ottoman audience in western European ways and, at the same
time, gain contact with western European intellectual trends.
Because Sinasi involved himself in both liberal politics and
literature, his protégés became very influential in journalism and
in the movement for a constitution and representative government.
His chief disciple Namik Kemal, kept these issues alive in his
numerous contributions to the very active Turkish émigré press.[]
Sinasi, with his political and literary work, paved the way for the
Young Ottomans. After the foundation of the secret society of Young
Ottomans against the absolutism of the Ottoman Palace, the fight
through newspapers and journals, now backed by novels and plays,
gained a new momentum. Although all three schools of romanticism,
realism and naturalism found followers in Ottoman literature, the
dominating theme in most of them was the discrepancies between the
“western style of life” and “traditional Islam.”[]
While Namik Kemal was introducing new concepts like “fatherland” and
“freedom” in his works, Ahmet Mithat and Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem were
criticizing the “over-westernization” of the upper class Ottomans.[]
Both political attitudes were among the “hot” issues discussed in
the daily newspapers as well as in journals revealing the ambivalent
attitude of the Young Ottomans toward westernization. They borrowed
the main concepts of “national identity” from the West, but they
feared western culture as a threat to that very identity which they
wanted to create around the concept of “Ottomanism.”
As one can imagine, such an inconsistent ideology caused great
controversies among the Young Ottomans themselves. They cherished
ultra-westernists like Abdullah Cevdet on the one hand and yet
supported the Islamic reformer, Ali Suavi, on the other.
Actually, from the very start of “westernization” the two schools of
thought, Islamic revivalism and adoption of western culture had
grown hand in hand an would eventually give rise, it was hoped, to a
“national culture” composed of elements of both based on the
foundation of Turkish Revolution led by Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk).
5. Main Currents of
Thought Prior to the Republic
Although Ziya Gokalp is treated as the champion of Turkish
Nationalism, a close look at his ideas reveals that his real
position was more conciliatory than that of a fanatic nationalist.
As late as 1913, as the ideologue of the powerful Union and Progress
Party, he wrote:
In our country there are three currents of thought. When we study
their history, we see that in the beginning our thinkers realized
the need for modernization. The current of thought in that
direction, which originated during the reign of Selim III
(1789-1807), was followed later by another - the movement towards
Islamization. The third, the movement of Turkism, has come forth
only recently.”
Gokalp continued to identify his “currents of thought” through the
journals in which they were advocated. Interestingly enough, he did
not mention any specific journals or newspapers dealing with
“modernization,” by which he actually meant “westernization” because
he believed that most journals had advocated modernization. But with
regard to “Islamization,” he considered Sirat-i Mustakim and later
Sibil ur-Resat as the leading journals. The school of Turkism was
represented by Turk Yurdu (the Turkish Hearth) to which Gokalp
contributed regularly. Gokalp also explained Gabriel Tarde(s ideas
on the development of nationalism and then developed his ideas on
Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire. After scanning Ottoman
history for factors of unity, he concluded: “In short, the Turkish
nation today belongs to the Ural-Altaic group of peoples, to the
Islamic ummet, and to Western internationality.”[]
Although Gokalp then became the fervent advocate of Turkish
nationalism, it was not very easy for anybody to be a “nationalist”
in his times. The dominant political solution, represented by the
Party of Union and Progress which was in power, was Ittihad-i anasir
(union of the different communities in the Empire) despite Gokalp’s
nationalist inclinations. (Actually it was this political stand of
the Party which had forced Gokalp to be conciliatory regarding his
“three currents of thought.”) The famous poet Yahya Kemal (Beyatli)
wrote that the real nationalist were labeled as corrupt and wicked
if they were Turkists, as reactionary fanatics if they were Muslims,
and as traitors, if they were socialists.[] Thus, Gokalp, seeking a
sound base for his ideas supported his argument of “nationalism” on
sociological grounds by presenting new concepts such as “collective
conscience,” and using a positivist approach to social problems,
mostly based on the sociology of Emil Durkheim.[]
Gokalp was the ideologue for the existing political power in his
time. He was affected by the political power more than he was able
to influence it. Thus, he revised his views and prescriptions for
the salvation of the state Pan-turkism, to Turkish nationalism.
There is no question that he most influential political event he
witnessed was the victory of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Had he lived
longer (he died in 1924), he would have become the ideologue of the
Turkish Revolution.
His statist-elitist views based on centralized political power, were
not shared by Prince Sabahattin, another political thinker who also
used a sociological approach to present his views about the
“salvation” of the Empire. Sabahattin was the follower of the
“Science Sociale” approach of Le Play. He used Edmond Demolins’
classification of societies in terms of the “communitaire” and
“particulariste” against Gokalp’s Durkheimian evolutionary theory.
Sabahattin was an ardent advocate of decentralized administration
and private entrepreneurship as the principles through which the
Empire could be saved.[] As the “dissenter” in the Party of Union
and Progress, he had to spend most of his life in Europe. Although
his approaches were noteworthy in the chaotic years of decline, his
proposals were not realistic and suitable for the Ottoman social and
political structure, and no school reflecting his ideas remained
after his death.
It would be surprising if no indication of Marxist views could be
traced in those years of political turmoil. Actually, Marxist views
were represented by Sosyalist Hilmi (Hilmi the Socialist) in the
1910’s, first by the Journal Istirak, ant then in the Ottoman
Socialist Party (Osmanli Sosyalist Firkasi) which was founded in the
same year.[] At the same time, a friend of Trotsky, Alexander Israel
Helphand, so-called Parvus Efendi, was analyzing the Ottoman
economic situation in Marxist terms in his brochure and in articles
which appeared in the Turkish journal Turk Yurdu.[]
Hilmi was under the influence of French socialism as represented by
Jean Jaures.[] Thus, his movement can also be classified as a part
of the “influence of western culture,” despite the fact that he was
looking for bonds between Islam and socialism.[] He was also trying
to get the support for the Christian minorities.
6. Schools of Social
Thought in the Republican Era
Turkey is one of the countries in which the interaction and
interdependence between political movements and social thought can
best be observed. The successful War of National Independence under
the political and military leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,
influenced almost all the currents of social thought as well as all
the political factions. The change of the political system from
religious-traditional to the modern-secular appeared to achieve the
complete victory of the “modernists,” including the Turkish
Nationalists and Westernists, against the Islamists and the
Marxists. Since the War of Liberation was also fought physically
against the troops of the Sultan-Caliph under the guise of
“rebellions” against the Ankara Government, the Islamists did not
stand a chance of revival in the early years of the Republic. The
same happened to the Marxists, after Mustafa Suphi the leader of the
Turkish Communist Party drowned in the Black Sea with his wife and
14 men, on his way back to Baku after an unsuccessful attempt to
join the Ankara Government in 1921. Nevertheless, neither the
Islamist, nor the Marxist movements came to an end. both continued
their activities either legally or illegally without any real
political influence in the early years of Republic.
The national unionist character of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s
charismatic leadership actually forced all the political groups
either to reconcile themselves with the existing power or to become
ineffective politically. Considering the long tradition of
literature, through which political ideas were presented, it is easy
to understand why the literary journals and newspapers in Turkey
became the means for the expression of political views. Thus it is
fair to state that the leftist trends as symbolized by the journal
Aydinlik and the rightist inclinations as represented by Dergah in
the 1920’s are still relevant to the history of Turkish social
thought.[]
In the 1930’s, parallel to the attempts to revive the political and
socio-economic life of the country following the abortive “Free
Party” experience, Ulku, the official journal of the People’s Houses
was issued as the spokesman for the Kemalist ideology. This ideology
was to be more clearly articulated in the following years. Of course
it was not just a coincidence that the quasi-Marxist Kadro had
already started publication about a year earlier: the successful
Turkish Revolution needed to be “doctrinized” both against Marxism
and Islamism.
The years of the 1930’s were marked ideologically by the struggle
between Kadro and the Republican People’s Party. It was a hopeless
fight for Kadro, despite its advocating more universal principles to
interpret Ataturk’s success. Political struggles were carried out
through political parties, not through journals of “thought.” Thus,
the Republican People’s Party emerged triumphant and the “six
arrows” were formulated as Kemalist ideology. This ideology is still
facing the challenge of such universal doctrines as Islamism,
Marxism and Turkism.[]
7. Ataturk’s Conception
of Culture
Gokalp’s eclecticism is evident in his differentiation between
civilization and culture. According to Gokalp, who was trying to
prove that Turkish culture is compatible with western civilization.
“Civilization is created by men’s conscious actions and is a
rational product”, whereas “the elements of a culture rise and grow
spontaneously.” Thus, he proposes that the patterns of western
civilization should be filled by Turkish cultural elements.
The erroneous character of such analysis stems from the very fact
that both culture and civilization are made of the same elements.
The only difference between them is in their scope. Interestingly
enough, it was Ataturk, trying to impose contemporary culture on a
rural and stagnant society who pointed out the discrepancies in
Gokalp’s ideas. Gokalp, elaborating the differences between culture
and civilization continued: “When a conflict occurs between a nation
strong in culture but weak in civilization and one which is
culturally disrupted but superior in civilization, the former always
wins.”[]
Seven years later, Ataturk while busy with the formation of the
“loyal opposition,” namely the Free Party, dictated his views on
culture and civilization, replying almost word for word to Gokalp’s
contentions: “There are people who give different definitions for
civilization. I think it is difficult and unnecessary to
differentiate civilization from culture. In order to explain my
view, let me define what culture is: it is the accumulation of
achievements of a human society in the areas of: A - State affairs,
B - the sphere of thought, namely science, sociology and fine arts,
C - economic affairs, namely, agriculture, crafts, trade and
commerce, and highway, sea and air transportation.” After those
words, Ataturk also refuted Gokalp’s contention about the superior
nature of culture over civilization in the struggles between nations
by giving examples from Turkish history. Ataturk then concluded his
remarks on culture with the following words: “In summary,
civilization is nothing but culture.”[]
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was by no means a social anthropologist, but a
political leader who was trying to modernize a traditional society
and was very aware of the barrier of chauvinist nationalism against
a humanitarian culture on which his nationalism had been structured.
His belief in freedom and human dignity produced the political
definition of “nationalism”, namely, the political attachment to the
Turkish Republic free of any racial or religious prerequisite.
8. Developments in the
Era of Democracy
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk died untimely in 1938 without being able to
see the establishment of a multi-party regime in Turkey. but with
the firm belief in humanitarian and democratic ideals of
contemporary civilization, the Turkish Republican revolutionaries
achieved the foundation of a democracy under the leadership of Ismet
Inonu, a close friend of Ataturk, ho had become President after his
death. Inonu was proclaimed the “National Leader” and the “Eternal
Leader of the Republican People’s Party” after Ataturk’s death, but
today he still retains the honor of being the only authoritarian
leader in the world who voluntarily established democracy at the
expense of his own power.[] In his decision to establish democracy
in Turkish society, Inonu was affected by two prevailing currents,
one domestic and the other international. The domestic current was
articulated in his firm stand to create a modern society including a
“modern political system,” in this case, meaning “the establishment
of democracy.” Internationally, Inonu was under the pressure of
western democracies which had triumphed in World War II over the
dictatorships. Thus being or trying to be a member of the Western
World, Inonu wished to come to terms with the United Nations ideals
as set forth in San Francisco.
Following the decision to implement democracy, the legal barriers
for the formation of socialist parties were abolished and the whole
legal system was liberalized accordingly. Thus, socialist
intellectuals started to issue a journal again. The leftist Gorusler
(Views) was issued jointly by liberals and by socialists. At the
same time two socialist parties were formed in 1946. but after a
short while both parties were closed down. The new experience in
democracy would be achieved without socialist and Marxist
viewpoints. There was a gentleman's agreement between the powerful
Republican Party and the newly formed Democrat Party against both
Marxist and religious parties, though, after a short while, the
Democrat Party became very tolerant of religious political
activities. In 1950, the Democrat Party came to power as a result of
free elections. Regarding the movements of social and political
thought, it meant that the revival of the religious activities would
be tolerated while strict measures against the left would continue.
Since the Republican attitude toward religious movements was based
on secular ideas, the movements was based on secular ideas, the main
controversy in the area of politics turned out to be a struggle
between the secular modernists, and traditionals who were backing
religious viewpoints. As the Democrat Party was advocating more
liberal economic practices, their traditionalism in social and
cultural affairs, coupled with the liberalism in the economy
resulted in a peculiar synthesis of “traditional-liberals.” Against
them, the Republicans with their “etatist” inclinations in economics
and a revolutionary “elitist” attitude toward social and cultural
affairs, allied themselves with the civilian and military
bureaucrats, and formed the “statist-elitist” approach.[] As a
result of these development, all the religious and even anti-Kemalist
elements found protection in the Democrat Party which had come to
power in 1950, whereas the Republicans in the opposition became more
tolerant, even supportive of leftist ideas.
Parallel to the revival of Islamic and even reactionary political
activities, the Islamists flourished in the areas of thought and
literature too. Nevertheless, the Marxists were not inactive. In an
atmosphere of restrained political activity, most of their efforts
were directed to literary production. Thus the decade of the 1950’s
was barren in terms of socio-political thought, but quite colorful
with regard to political-literary activities.
The military made a decisive move in 1960 to restore democracy which
had been distorted by the Democrat Party after the parliamentary
opposition, including the activities of the Republican People’s
Party, had been suppressed through changes in the legal system. The
military, conditioned by the Kemalist principles of
constitutionalism and secularism, was forced to move in as both
principles were breached severely by the practices of the Democrat
Party.[] This coup marked the beginning of a new era for the “social
welfare state” with all its implications in the area of basic rights
and freedoms.
9. Changes After the
Military Intervention of 1960
The most important aspect of the military intervention of 1960 was
the establishment of “parliamentary democracy” in the real sense of
the term. Such a political development had a deep effect on the
evolution of social thought since it permitted the healthy
reflection of social ideas in the political arena. Thus, from 1960
on, the history of social thought in Turkey has become the history
of political parties.
The first development took place in the area of socialist thought.
Some of the prominent Marxists and other leftists joined the Turkish
Labor Party, which had been formed after the May 1960 intervention.
They were backed by weekly and monthly journals in which they
followed the traditional lines of “politics through periodicals.”
The Turkish Labor Party played the role of political leadership for
the Marxists and quasi-Marxists, until the end of the 1960’s when it
fell apart as a result of differences of opinion about the strategy
and tactics of a “socialist party,” in the light of concrete
socio-economic conditions in Turkey. The main issue was the
controversy on the “stage of development” of Turkish society. some
thought that the society was ready for a socialist transformation,
while others thought that it was at the stage of “national
democratic revolution” as the feudal structure was still dominant
and national independence had not yet been achieved. This struggle
marked the end of the Turkish Labor Party which received three
percent of the vote in the 1965 elections. Another development which
was responsible for the weakening of the Party was political: The
“national remainder system” in the election law which enabled the
Turkish Labor Party to receive more than ten seats in the Parliament
was abolished to prevent the influence of the leftists in the
Parliament. Thus, in the 1969 elections, though the ration of the
votes remained more or less the same (2.7 percent) the labor seats
feel from 14 to 2. Frustrated with the inefficient mechanism to
express themselves in the Parliament, different factions in the
Party then formed independent political groups with their own
journals and newspapers until 1971 when the “12th of March
Memorandum” of the military put an end to almost all leftist
activities temporarily. In the meantime the Turkish Labor Party was
closed by the Supreme Court on the grounds that it had been involved
in some separationist activities regarding ethnic groups in Turkey.
Nevertheless, the social parties resumed their activities after
parliamentary democracy was fully restored following the 1973
elections. In addition, newly-formed extra-Parliamentary leftist and
“gauchist” groups appeared, some of which supported and were
involved in terrorism. Although the legal socialist parties tried to
stay out of terrorist activities, the “12th of September
Intervention” by the military put an end to all leftist politics and
other kinds of cultural activities associated with Socialist and
Marxist thought.
Another development regarding the leftist schools of social thought
after the 1960 intervention was the publication of the weekly
journal, Yon. Yon, (later Devrim) was advocating a reformist program
for the “nationalization” of the economy along the lines of Kemalism,
which was to be led by a military-civilian bureaucratic alliance.
Historically, it was the continuation of the Kadro, and the group
around Yon-Devrim which was influenced internationally by the
quasi-Marxist “center-periphery” model of world capitalist which
stressed “national independence” as a first political move for
economic development. With the “12th of March Memorandum” of 1971,
this group came to an end, purged by the military establishment.
Actually the Yon-Devrim group was looking for a synthesis between
Kemalism and socialism with a “statist-elitist” approach.
The developments in right-wing social thought after the 1960
Intervention took a little bit more time than left-wing developments
for two reasons: First of all, by the elimination of the Democrat
Party, a political gap occurred in the right wing political
structure which had encompassed and supported the conservative and
reactionary schools of social thought. Secondly, since the military
was very sensitive about religious reactionary groups, such
inclinations were suppressed for a while both politically and
socially in an atmosphere of military rule. but as soon as the
Justice Party emerged as the heir to the former Democrat Party, the
old coalition of religious traditionalists together with the
economic liberals re-established itself and continued until the
religious faction formed its own organization in 1970 under the name
of the National Order Party. This became the National Salvation
Party after the National Order Party was closed one year later by
the Supreme Court on the grounds that it had violated the 1961
Constitution by misusing religious beliefs for political purposes.
Actually, the end of the sixties witnessed the clarification of
Turkish politics along the lines of the social and philosophical
beliefs of the different groups. In addition to the developments
summarized above, the racist groups formed their own political
organization for the extreme nationalists who had survived in
Turkish cultural life under the name of “Turkists” since the time of
Gokalp. This Party then became the source and supporter of the right
wing terrorism which eventually caused the ideological and moral
degradation of Turkish Nationalism
In the meantime, another interesting development took place in
Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party. Affected by the growing support
for the Turkish Labor Party in 1965, Ismet Inonu, still leader of
the Republican Party and the closes friend of Ataturk, declared that
his Party stood “at the left of center,” meaning it took a mild
social democratic attitude. This was a revolutionary change for the
relatively conservative structure of the Party. It turned out to be
a revolution in the real sense of the word when the general
secretary of the Party, Ecevit, won the elections in the Party
General Assembly as the leader of the “leftist group” against the
will of the president and Ismet Inonu, one-time “eternal leader” of
the Party.
From then on, the differences of opinion between the social
democrats and the Marxists became more articulated because the
Republican People’s Party had become the representative of social
democracy, a view which had been represented by extra-parliamentary
groups up to that time. During this process of articulation (if not
polarization) of the various currents of social thought, Kemalism
was accepted as a banner of many organizations but really used as a
source of inspiration only by the Yon-Devrim group and by the
Republican People’s Party. Needless to say both groups had a revised
notion of Kemalism and Kemalist principles according to their
original political inclinations.
The military intervened in 1971 in the name of Kemalism while the
Justice Party was in power at a time when terrorist activities were
in their infancy (until then almost no political killings). The
military suppressed all kinds of leftist activities both Marxist an
non-Marxist. It was the end of the Yon-Devrim line of thought as an
elitist-leftist movement. Although the intervention also affected
the religious groups, since they had a sound base (about a million
voters consisting of about 10 percent of the total), they were able
to survive. Actually all the effects of military intervention were
swept away thoroughly after the free elections of 1973.
The political development which took place after the elections in
the process of forming the government, had an important impact on
Turkish social thought: the Kemalist Republicans allied with their
eternal enemy, the religious National Salvation Party. This was a
very important development which not only legitimized the religious
groups politically but also had a deep impact on Turkish cultural
synthesis between the “modernists” and “traditionalists”, or in
other terms, between the Kemalists and the Islamists.
Though such a coalition was quite meaningful and noteworthy
regarding cultural values, it did not work out politically. The
coalition of the “leftist” modernists with the “rightist” Islamists
fell apart. After a period of transition, the so-called “nationalist
front” (milliyetci cephe) was formed among the racists, the
Islamists and the liberal rightists, under the leadership of the
Justice Party. The opportunity for right-wing terrorists to
infiltrate into the government apparatus came about through this
“front.”
After political developments resulting from the failures of
so-called “nationalist front” and the Republican government which
had followed it, escalating terrorism accounted for as many as
thirty deaths per day. The military moved in once again in the name
of Kemalism and put an end to every kind of political activity with
the resulting implications for social and cultural life.
10. Recent Developments
in Cultural Life
It is not very far-fetched to view Turkish cultural development as a
dichotomy which will eventually reach a new synthesis: the
development of traditional Islamic culture on one hand, and the
development of a modern one, which can be called “ western” or
“contemporary” culture on the other. both lines of development are
open to and influenced by external factors which give them not only
a rationale for their existence but also a sense of belonging to the
“contemporary! world. Thus, not only French, Russian and Chinese
revolutions, but also Libyan, and Iranian revolutions had their own
(and in some cases quite limited) effects on Turkish society. All
the political and ideological trends such as Marxism, Trotskyism,
Maoism, the Islamic Revival, Eurocommunism, social democracy, and an
Islamic Republic, which are often different in nature and
antithetical in relation to one another, serve as the international
precedents for various groups in Turkey.
Again, both lines of social thought although seeking international
ties and relations, have a deep sense of Turkish folk culture and
thus try to root themselves in their land and its people providing
them with the colorful aspects of historical and local
characteristics.
A shrewd observer will not have any difficulty in finding a lot of
similarities between these two different and even rival cultural
trends in Turkey which have paved the way for many interesting
developments. Since they are both the products of the same society,
such a similarity is quite expected in terms of their dialectical
approach to local and international cultures. These are, of course,
influenced deeply by the Kemalist principle of “nationalism” based
on a great sense of the “integrity of human kind.”
Affected by the same political atmosphere, both lines of social
thought could not protect themselves completely from being
“over-politicized” after the 1960 military intervention. For
example, in the sphere of theater, the audience witnessed some plays
in which the “artistic side” of the drama was sacrificed for the
sake of the “ideological message.” Although this trend was not
persistent and faded away gradually, it negatively affected the
aesthetic level of cultural product, whereas the very same
“politization process” also helped the development of different
lines of new socio-cultural schools based on a new synthesis of
traits taken from both currents within the culture. The best
examples of such new development can be observed in the area of
literature.
A new politico-cultural trend can be traced in Turkish literature in
the activities of a group of writers and poets who can be labeled as
the Eyyubi’s. They are looking for new approaches in the synthesis
between the folklore of the Anatolian soil and western civilization,
with a special emphasis on ancient Greece not only as a source for
western culture but also as a background for Anatolian
civilizations. This author has labeled them Eyyubi after Sabahattin
Eyuboglu, not only because he was one of the leaders of the approach
but also because the word Eyyubi, which denotes his name, is at the
same time reminiscent of Islamic cults in which the same type of
solidarist relations among the followers dominated.[] Among the
group are prominent writers like Halikarnas Balikcisi (Cevat Sakir),
Azra Erhat and Vedat Gunyol.
A similarly new and interesting line of politico-cultural trend can
be named as Tahiri, after the famous writer Kemal Tahir. The
Tahiri’s had a scent of an anti-Kemalist approach as Kemalism had
done away with the glorious Ottoman culture according to them and
they were in love with Ottoman civilization. They were not less
important nor less effective than the Eyyubi producing high quality
poems and novels, even if they did not reflect the historical facts
correctly, a reservation especially true for Kemal Tahir’s so-called
“historical” novels.
Interestingly enough both new schools the Tahiri’s and the Eyyubi’s,
with all the internationality and nationality in their approaches
are nevertheless the products of Kemalism, in the sense that the
fertile ground of present Turkish society which has given rise to
them was molded through the revolution realized by Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk.
We should also add that the present diversification of the literary
trends as well as of socio-political thought can by no means be
reduced to the above two. These are mentioned to give some
illustration of the new development.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Turkey is the first and the only secular country in the world of
Islam. Not only geographically but also culturally, she is a bridge
between Asia and Europe - to be more exact, a cultural bridge
between Eastern and Western civilizations. She is a Middle-Eastern
country and also a Balkan state. Being a Mediterranean country, at
the same time, she has a unique place in the world. There is no
question that, being placed so beautifully among various
geographical and historical cultures, Turkey stands a good chance of
producing a new cultural synthesis for the coming age of the “Third
Wave.”[]
Not only the external stimuli of a new age but also the domestic
developments herald such a genesis. Regarding domestic developments,
there are at least three different areas which have recently become
quite meaningful at the micro level. First of all, the universities,
in addition to their role in the creation of a new national identity
in terms of scientific activities in the areas of history, language,
sociology and the like, have started to put a special emphasis on
fine arts and related subject. Among the newly-formed departments
are theater, drama, music, graphic arts, painting, sculpture, cinema
and many others which contribute to the development of Turkish
culture toward new frontiers. There is no doubt that the production
of the universities especially in the areas of the social sciences
and humanities which has been realized in an atmosphere of almost
total academic freedom since 1960 has paved the way for such
fruitful progress in art and culture through the accumulation of
knowledge about Turkish society as well as about the human cultural
heritage.
Secondly, the local governments and the individual municipalities
have started to pay special attention to cultural activities in
order to develop and present the cultural heritage of their own
geographical areas.[] Although such activities are mostly geared
toward touristic goals, there is no doubt that they contribute to
the cultural development. For example, the film festival of Antalya
Municipality has become one of the most important cultural events in
the country and has even contributed to the rise of a new school of
“young directors” in the Turkish cinema. Many of the “city
festivals” are multi-purpose and multi-functional and include
international activities and performances as well as national ones
in the areas of music, theater and ballet. The Istanbul festival is
a good example of the “mixed” festivals, mixed in terms of various
activities and of different nationalities. Thus not only the central
government, but also the local governments, support activities along
the lines of the preservation and presentation of both the cultural
heritage and contemporary culture.
A third development which took place quite recently is the rise of
interest in voluntary associations and of large-scale capital and
financial holding companies entered the “cultural market” either
through their “cultural foundations” or directly through “cultural
departments” formed within their organizations. Such a development
has resulted directly in the rising prices of paintings for private
collections and in he increasing number of “musicals” which are
financed and backed by these “big capitalists.” Just to give an
example, I should mention that the number of private art galleries
in the city of Ankara has risen to about twenty, each having a new
painting exhibition every fifteen days.
In addition to such developments, many of the large companies have
established awards for arts, literature and the social sciences. For
example, the largest private bank in Turkey has been giving awards
for three years in the areas of “literature,” “arts” and “social
sciences and humanities.” Each annual award is equal to five times
the salary of a university professor. The same practice a newspaper
started five years ago with awards in various areas including, arts,
sciences, social sciences, sports and communication. The monetary
prize is about four times of the salary of a university professor,
who is among the best paid of government bureaucrats in Turkey.
Awards, especially those in literary fields, have a long history in
Turkey. With symbolic monetary values, such as one-fourth of the
salary of a professor, many awards were established in the names of
writers by their families. The state has also given awards from time
to time and it seems that a more stable system has been established
recently in the areas of arts and literature. The Turkish Language
Association, which was founded by Ataturk, has an award system with
a long history in almost all the areas of literature and also the
social sciences. The rising interest of large scale organizations in
arts and literature covers the social sciences and humanities almost
in all cases. Such an attitude stems from a deep sense of
appreciation for those kinds of activities and reflects a modern and
positivist approach to society. Another development regarding the
rise of capitalism in Turkey is being observed in the area of
publication. Artistic and literary journals which were previously
owned by either a group of writers who shared the same political
view, or by people who held the same thoughts regarding arts and
literature, are now being faced by the rivalry of colorful magazines
of art and literature financed by large holding companies.
Though it is quite early to judge the effects of these recent
micro-domestic developments in Turkish culture, we may conclude this
analysis of the transformation of the socio-cultural structure of
modern Turkey at macro level, by pointing out that up to the last
quarter of the twentieth century, arts and literature played the
role as outlets for political dispositions, whereas they have now
started to be reflections of socio-economic development.
Urbanization and democratization processes seem to be the two main
social forces which will shape the future of Turkish society. Both
processes will serve as the agents of change toward more just income
distribution and more stable social relations. Thus the new cultural
synthesis is expected to rise on this new socio-economic foundation.
This synthesis will have both “western” and “Islamic” cultural
traits. But the main characteristic will be “Mediterranean” with all
the geographical and historical implications of the word.
This article is published in “The Transformation of Turkish Culture,
The Ataturk Legacy”,
Emre
Kongar, Gunsel Renda and C. Max Kortepeter, ed., The Kingston
Press. Inc. Princeton, New Jersey, 1986, pp. 19-68.
Source
website of
Prof.
Emre Kongar.
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