The Emergence
of Ottoman Empire (Osmanli Imparatorlugu)
 The foundation of the Ottoman Empire has been a major question in modern
historiography. How a small frontier principality on the Seljuk-Byzantine
borderland developed into one of the most powerful empires of modern times
still puzzles historians. How did it happen that this state, embodying
two imperial heritages, Islamic and Byzantine, created a long lasting empire
in Asia Minor and the Balkans? Herbert Adams Gibbons presents a theory
of religious conversion as the answer to the fundamental question of the
demographic, cultural, and institutional origins of the Ottoman state.
Though popularized widely in general histories, this theory barely stands
up to the criticisms of the philologically-grounded historians specializing
in the field, such as M. Fuad Koprulu, Paul Wittek, and Friedrich Giese.
Subjecting the early sources on the origins of the Ottomans to a thorough
analysis, these specialists proposed the theory of a Turkish-Seljukid origin
of Ihe Ottoman state for population, culture, and state traditions. But
among these specialists controversy arose over thc question of the basic
structure of the early Ottoman society. While Koprulu suggested that it
was predominantly tribal in character, Wittek considered it a military
frontier society with a peculiar frontier culture. In fact, Wittek believed
that it was basically the traditions of the Islamic military frontier organization
that provided the socio-political foundations of the Ottoman state and
that the Islamic tradition of Holy War gave it its dynamism for conquest
and innovation. Both scholars stressed the central role of the Turcomans (Turkmens), pastoral nomads in the frontier society, without attempting
to investigate the structure and internal changes of that society in the
period of state formation. Koprulu's fundamental work on the socio-religious
conditions of the Turcomans in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Anatolia,
although illustrating many significan points, did not answer the question
of how this society was transformed to a polity, or how Osman Ghazi became
a military-political leader and the founder of a new state and dynasty.
The early Ottoman traditions have not been thoroughly and critically
examined from this point of view. In this article I shall try to investigate,
first, the fundamental cause of the social change on the frontier as a
result of immigration and population pressure and, second, the primary
factors leading to the state formation in this frontier society at the
turn of the thirteenth century.
The spectacular Turkish expansion into western Anatolia can be linked
in the last analysis to the Mongol invasion and rule of the Middle East
in the thirteenth century. There is considerable historical evidence supporting
the view that this invasion caused an exodus of both the Turcoman tribes
and the settled populations from Transoxiana, Iran, and Azerbaijan into
Asia Minor. In the wake of the spread of Mongol control over Asia Minor
(recognition of Mongol suzerainty in 1235; the Mongol invasion of Central
Anatolia under Bayju in 1243; and, finally, the establishment of direct
Mongol administration after 1277) a massive population movement toward
the western frontier zone of the Seljukid state of Anatolia was set under
way, and this continued throughout the thirteenth century.
The important stages of this movement are known. In the 1230s the Mongols
drove out a number of Turcoman tribes from Maragha and Arran and from the
Mughan piains in Azerbaijan, an area that was to become the favorite winter
quarters of the Mongol tribal forces in Iran. Along with the Mongol pressure,
the search for good pasture lands for their herds in marginal areas and
the opportunity for booty raids into neighboring Christian lands led many
of the Turcoman tribes to the mountain ranges in the remote frontier (udj)
zones. Pressed by the Turcoman demands for yurt (a delimited area with
summer and winter quarters) and confronted by their depredations on agricultural
areas, the Seljukid central government hastened to drive them out toward
the frontier areas, where they formed a large Turcoman belt in the northern,
southern, and western mountain ranges of Asia Minor. In 1240, however,
a terrible Turcoman insurrection shook the Seljukid state to its foundations
In 1256 the Mongol general Bayju asked the Seljukid sultan, Izzeddin
Kaykawus II, to assign him summer and winter quarters in Anatolia for his
army tribes to settle in. This was after Hulagu Khan had ordered the evacuation
of Arran and Mughan plains to make way for the Mongol imperial army. The
sultan rejected Bayju's demand. The ensuing battle ended with the defeat
of the Seljukid army and their evacuation of the best pasture lands in
the Tokat-Amasya area, including the lush Kazova plain. This event brought
a new flow of Turcoman immigrants into the western border areas. Kaykawus
eventually fled to Byzantium (1261), but the Turcomans continued their
support for him and his sons against the Mongols. The following thirty
years were an era of struggle in Anatolia -- a struggle that brought still
more immigration. The figures provided by the Arab geographer Ibn Said
(d. 1274 or 1286) give at least a general idea of the relative distribution
of the Turcomans on these frontiers: 200,000 tents in the Tonguzlu (or Ladik, ancient
Laodicaea) region, 100,000 tents in the Kastamoni (Paphlagonia),
and 30,000 tents in the Kutahya (Cotyaeum).
The next period of massive population movement in Asia Minor began in
1277 when the native Seljukid aristocracy and their Turcoman supporters
allied themselves with the Mamluks of Egypt and rose up to fight a Holy
War against the ''impious" domination of the Mongols. Now the aggressive
spirit of jihad, resuscitated by the victor over the Mongols, Sultan Baybars
of Egypt, appeared to generate within Anatolia intense enthusiasm for the
battle against the Mongols, especially among the frontier Turcomans Hard
pressed by the Mongol forces, the most warlike and mobile elements of the
frontier Turcomans moved further west and south and directed their energies
for Holy War in raids (ghaza) against the inadequately protected territories
of Byzantium in western Anatolia and in Lesser Armenia in Cilicia. In order
to establish direct Mongol control in Seljukid Anatolia, fresh Mongol forces,
actually whole tribes, were sent to settle there after 1277, again mostly
in the Amasya-Tokat region. By the end of the thirteenth century these
forces amounted to five tumen's (50,000 men) and several ming's (one ming
was 1,000 men).
The civil war in the llkhanid Empire (1291-1295) and a series of rebellions
on the part of several Mongol military governors in Anatolia (Tughachar
and Baltu in 1297; Sulemish in 1298-99) with the ensuing repressions resulted
in the immigration of more Turcomans and, now, of certain Mongol tribes
as well, putting further pressure on the frontier During this period the
expansion of the Turcoman tribes toward the lower Sangarius (Sakarya) River
and their relentless raids into the Byzantine province of Mesothynion (the
peninsula of Nicomedia) were recorded by the contemporary historian Pachymeres.
He related all this to the disorders which took place in the Paphlagonian
frontier area between the Sangarius River and Kastamoni, a state of affairs
which led to Mongol interference. Osman Ghazi, the founder of the Ottoman
state, is mentioned for the first time in Byzantine sources as the leader
of these vigorous raids by Turcomans into the Byzantine territory at the
most advanced section of the frontier at the turn of the fourteenth century.
The weakening of Mongol power in Iran under Abu-Said (1317-1335) did
not abate the volatile struggle in Asia Minor, as the Mongol governor,
Timurtash (1318-1327), in command of strong forces in central Anatolia,
now tried to gain actual independence by strengthening his control over
the border areas. It should be added that Timurtash also adopted the Islamic
Holy War ideology and even approached the Mamluks in an effort to overshadow
the Turcoman ghazi leaders who had gained such great prestige in Asia Minor
through their exploits against the Byzantines. Timurtash was particularly
harsh in dealing with the begs who had, by now, established viable principalities
in the former Seljukid frontier region. As to the newly established ghazi
principalities of western Anatolia, they remained mostly beyond Timurtash's
reach; and now, more than ever before, they directed their actions toward
the Byzantine lands on the coasts. The period of 1291-1330 was indeed a
crucial one for the Turkish expansion into the Aegean world.
In about 1330, Al-'Umari's two sources estimated that the sixteen Turcoman
principalities established by that time could mobilize over half-a-million
cavalrymen -- the figure given by Balaban the Genoes -- or over a quarter-of-a-million
-- according to Haydar al-Uryan.'' In addition, they mentioned an unspecified
number of infantry. The figures were obviously greatly exaggerated. However,
if we remember that the majority of these forces consisted of Turcoman
tribesmen, the figure given for each individual principality can be interpreted
as the relative number of fighting tribesmen dependent upon a particular
lord or ruler. It is noteworthy that the highest figures in these accounts
were given for the Mentese-oghlu (100,000 in Caria), the Aydin-oghlu (70,000
in lonia), the Osman-oghlu (Ottomans -- 40,000 in Bythinia), the Karasi-oghlu
(over 40,000 in Mysia), and the Sarukhan-oghlu (18,000 in Lydia) -- all
of whom were operating in the area captured from the Byzantines in western
Anatolia between 1260 and 1330.
To sum up, a new Turkey with great demographic potential and a heightened
Holy War ideology, was emerging in the old Seljukid frontier zone east
of a line from the mouth of the Dalaman (Indos) River to that of the Sakarya (Sangarius). A thrust by this explosive frontier society against the neighboring
Byzantine territory in western Anatolia and in the Balkans was almost inevitable.
The expansion was accomplished in the following stages: (I) it began with
the seasonal movements of Turcoman nomadic groups into the Byzantine coastal
plains; (2) it was intensified by the organization of small raiding groups
under ghazi leaders, mostly of tribal ongin, for booty raids or for employment
as mercenaries; (3) it continued with the emergence of successful leaders
capable of bringing together under their clientship local chiefs to conguer
and then establish beyliks (principalities) in conquered lands on the model
of the principalities founded in the old Seljukid frontier zone; and finally
(4) with the involvement of these ghazi-beyliks, with their definite political
and economic aims, in the regional struggle for supremacy in the Aegean
and in the Balkans, the previously undirected thrusts of the war bands
became focused on new goals.
As a result of economic pressure in the predominantly nomadic society
of the frontier, the pursuit of economic activities supplementary to stock
raising was seen to occur before the period of large scale settlement.
Lumbering and carpet making became specializations among the nomads of
the southern and western parts of the area, as the market for these commodities
expanded in Egypt. In fact, carpets, lumber, and other forest products
such as nut-gall later on would constitute the main export items of the
ports of Antalya (Satalia), Alaiye (Candelore), Finike, Balat (Palatia),
and Ayasoluk (Altoluogo) under the Turcoman principalities.
The slave trade, with the growing demand from the large markets in Asia
Minor, Iran, and in the Arab lands and the generally rising price of slaves
during this period, appears to have had far reaching consequences for the
frontier society. Enslavement of the neighboring "infidels" became
a most profitable business as well as a ''pious" act. Thus it was
that between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries the Turkish chronicles
and the "gesta e vitae" literature, as well as Christian sources,
placed great emphasis on the enslaving activity of the ghazis. The continuous
raiding for slaves and the opportunity for employment as mercenaries appears
to have brought about a specialization and social differentiation in the
Turcoman frontier society.
Even if it is not to be taken as a truly historical account, the Ottoman
tradition on the origins and rise of Osman Ghazi is of particular interest,
for it aids one in understanding how, in a Turcoman clan of pastoral nomads,
a ghazi can emerge to create a subordinate band of mounted warriors and
comrades (noker or yoldash) constantly occupied with raiding the lands
of the ''infidel''. The distinction and the dominant position of the war
leader in the clan was further enhanced by the "coming under his flag"
of ever increasing numbers of gharibs (rootless wanderers of various origins).
These were always warmly welcomed by the leader and became "his people,"
his clients, personally attached to him and called by his name: Aydinli,
Sarukhanlu, Osmanli, or Mihallu. The process entailed a dissolution of
tribal kinship ties, with the exception of those of the leader's family,
who kept and consolidated their privileges within the peculiar pattern
of agnate kinship. The Holy War ideology, as much as the success of the
actual raids, reinforced ties within the band to produce a cohesive social
group centered around the leader. Consequently, dervishes embodying the
ghaza ideology and bringing to the leader's authority the spiritual sanction
of Islam were ever present within the frontier society. In actual fact,
the pattern of the change was a very old one, dating back to the Central
Asian Turks. What happened in the second half of the thirteenth century
was an unprecedented extension of the process, apparently as a result of
population pressure, coupled with the central government's loss of control
over these Turcomans and with the collapse of the Byzantine defenses in
western Anatolia. Now Turcoman war bands occupied themselves as mercenary
companies in the service of the Christian governments throughout the Balkans
as well as in staging booty raids.
The increase in horse breeding in the udj areas can be considered both
cause and effect of this transformation. The territory where the Turcomans
had their yurt were congenial to horse breeding, and horse breeding in
Anatolia showed considerable development during this period. Horse prices
were quite low; and as the fame of Anatolian Turcoman horses spread, they
came to be in great demand in neighboring countries. Until the mid-sixteenth
century, horsemanship, along with peculiar Turco-Mongol tactics, constituted
the basic military advantage of the Turcoman and Ottoman troups facing
western armies. Infantry continued to exist, its ranks filled by soldiers
drafted from among the Muslim reaya (the tax paying subjects) in the early
Turcoman principalities as well as in the early Ottoman state; but cavalry (sipahi), was the foundation of the military elite, and Cavalrymen enjoyed
full membership in the ruling class; riding was considered a privilege,
and was denied to the ordinary reaya in these societies.
The role, at this early stage, of the tribal war bands as mercenary
companies, occasionally referred to as boluk in Turkish, must be emphasized.
At this time, Turkish mercenaries were generally eastern Mediterranean
-- just as were the Almogavars in the western Mediterranean. By 1300 the
decline of the fief-holding feudal cavalry had become universal throughout
the Mediterranean world. The governments in Italy and in the Balkans had
by now learned from experience that the hiring of mercenary companies was
by far the most preferable course open to them. In the Balkans the governments
even competed against each other to attract the Turcoman mercenary companies,
who, for their part, were often satisfied with mere booty, especially in
the form of slaves. These companies were considered militarily the most
efficient not only because of the superiority of their weapon, the famous
Turkish bow, but also because of their unique organization and their proved
professionalism, the product of long experience in fighting together. It
seams that the Byzantine government under Andronicus II was justified in
trying to recover (through extraordinary impositions on the fiefs) the
state revenues accumulated in the hands of the provincial gentry, who proved
to be no longer militarily efficient. By such means the government was
believed to have accumulated funds sufficient to hire the mercenary companies
of Alans, Kipchaks, Turks, or Catalan-Almogavars.
As an alternative to the ghaza raid, the opportunity for overseas employment
with the prospect of taking rich booty must have encourage the formation
of more and more mercenary boluks among the frontier Turcomans. Once such
a company came into being, it had to continue as such. Grim experiences
in overseas Christian countries, sometimes ending in terrible massacres,
taught them the advantages of assembling in still larger groups, as a kind
of confederation, under an able leader. This evolution led to the emergence
of the begs, the founders of the frontier principalities. The detailed
account of Umur Ghazi's activities provides a clear picture of this process.
The cooperation of Turkish boluks with the Catalan company in Thrace and
Greece between 1305 and 1311 should also be viewed as a result of it. But
the larger the groups, the greater the difficulty of finding adequate provisions
through simple pillage within a limited circuit of The mercenaries were
indispensable to the governments employing them during the first half of
the fourteenth century. But their ever-present inclination toward pillage,
their readiness to change sides when promised better conditions -- all
natural features of the mercenary institution -- made instability a predominant
feature of international politics in the 8alkans during this period. There
was a parallel situation in Italy during the same period of great mercenary
use, 1320 to 1380. Attempts to use feudal forces or militia against the
mercenaries invariably ended in pitiful defeat. For example, a sizeable
Turkish mercenary force of 5,000 men hired by Michael Palaeologus to fight
against the Franks of the Morea first won him success; but when they changed
sides in 1264, the Franks gained the upper hand. Along with other freebooters,
Turks were also enrolled during this period in the Byzantine navy.
In the critical years of the Turkish advance in western Anatolia, the
Byzantine government hastened first to hire the Alan mercenaries, 7,000
in number, who were seeking employment after the execution of Nogay in
1299; the famous Catalan company was hired in 1304. Although pledging to
fight for the Cross or for Islam, Catalan and Turkish mercenaries easily
came to terms among themselves about pursuit of their common interests.
More than once the Byzantine government (and later on Cantacuzenus), weakened
and financially strapped by decentralizing forces, tried to satisfy the
mercenaries in their service by directing them to pillage in unfriendly
neighboring countries: not only Bulgaria and Serbia, but also the Greek
lands which were thought to be rebellious. Cantacuzenus considered it to
be, even for the Byzantine state itself, a privilege and a piece of good
fortune to secure the continued support of Turkish forces from Anatolia
-- as long as they remained uninterested in conquest or settlement in the
Balkans.
At this juncture, Turkish groups acting as ghazi raiding parties or
mercenary companies had joined together and come under the command of powerful
leaders such as Umur Ghazi of the Aydin dynasty and Orkhan and his son
Suleyman Pasa of the Ottoman house; and only through these leaders could
the Byzantines hope to acquire sizeable mercenary aid from Anatolia. These
Turkish begs were thus the real beneficiaries of "their services as
loyal friends of the Byzantines" (to put it in the terms of the Byzantine
sources). Through alliance with the Byzantines, the Turcoman begs could
provide employment and booty for the ever-growing number of ghazis gathering
under their flags to raid on an increasingly larger scale in the Balkans.
Umur was not interested in either conquest or settlement on overseas lands.
However, Suleyman Pasa found conditions favorable for such policies, and
in 1352 he declared his epoch-making decision to change direction by occupying
Tzympe, a bridgehead on the European side of the Dardanelles.
Prof.
Dr. Halil Inalcik, "The Question of the Emergence of
the Ottoman State" in International Journal of Turkish Studies, vol. II,
1980, pp. 71-79.
TransAnatolie Tour
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