|
7. MACEDONIA |
|---|
| Nikola Kljusev |
1991-1999 |
| Savo Klimovoski |
1999 |
| Boris Trajkovski |
1999-present |
Claimed by Bulgaria and seized by Serbia in the Balkan Wars, Macedonia was nevertheless allowed to leave Yugoslavia in 1991 with a minimum of hassle. Much more hassle came from Greece, which felt threatened by this tiny state using the name "Macedonia" and, apparently, identifying itself with the
Macedonia of Alexander the Great. The new flag
featured the "Star of
Vergina," from the tomb of Philip II of Macedon. This implied Macedonian designs on northern Greece, also containing part of historic Macedonia; and indeed Macedonians did express some claims there. I even saw stickers on lampposts in New York City proclaiming "Macedonia is Greek!" What this was supposed to mean was not going to be obvious to anyone. It made it sound like Greece itself had designs on the new Republic of Macedonia. Did anyone even in New York City know, or care, what this was all about? Probably not.
As it happened, Greece initially blocked admission of Macedonia to the United Nations. The flag was modified and the country is now usually referred to as the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (FYRM). Bulgaria seems to have given up claims to Macedonia, but I am still not clear whether Macedonian is or is not a dialect of Bulgaria. There are ways to determine this. Otherwise, the region has simply never been anything but "Macedonia."
I have received correspondence from a couple of Greeks disputing this, contending that the territory of the FYRM was never in historic Macedonia. Well, there is going to be considerable uncertainty about all ancient boundaries, and there is no telling how far Philip II's Macedonia extended north. Chances are it was well into FYRM territory (probably the whole valley of the
Vardar/Axios River). Nevertheless, for Roman Macedonia the boundaries are better known. The capital of the
FYRM, Skopje (Roman Scupi), was definitely in the early Roman province of Moesia Superior (later Dacia
Mediterranea). However, the boundary of Moesia was immediately south of Skopje, which itself is quite close to the northern boundary of the
FYRM. One map in the Atlas of the Roman World (Tim Cornell & John Matthews, Facts on File Publications, 1982, 1988, p.75) shows the bend of the Axius
(Axios/Vardar) River, with Scupi on the north bank, as the actual northern boundary of Macedonia. Other maps (pp.141, 146) show some of the bend itself in Moesia, but this still leaves most of the territory of the FYRM in Roman Macedonia. The Roman cities of Stobi (near modern
Stip), Lychnidus (modern Ohrid), and Heraclea Lyncestis (near modern Bitola) were all in Roman Macedonia and in the present
FYRM. There is agreement on this in the Atlas of Classical History (Richard
J.A. Talbert, Routledge, 1985, 1989, p.143).
For some, Macedonian claims to Greek Macedonia may be based on the territorial integrity of the Macedonia of Philip II and on the presumed ethnic identity of the modern Macedonians with the ancient. This kind of claim cannot now be taken seriously, both because ancient boundaries are going to mean nothing in modern international law and because the modern Macedonians speak a
Slavic language which certainly has nothing to do with the (albeit poorly attested) language of the ancient Macedonians. The other basis of Macedonian claims, however, is more serious, and that concerns Macedonians living in Greece. The Greeks deny that there is any such presence; but then Greece officially denies that there are any ethnic minorities in Greece. Linguistic maps of Greece in the 19th century show areas of speakers of Albanian,
Vlach, Macedonian, and even Turkish. The Anchor Atlas of World History, Volume II (Hermann Kinder, Werner
Hilgemann, Ernest A. Menze, and Harald and Ruth Bukor, 1978) shows Macedonian speakers extending from south of Skopje (Üsküp in Turkish, in a partially Albanian speaking area, continguous with Kosovo) all the way down to Thessalonica (p.120). If there are no longer Macedonian speakers in the modern Greek part of this area (only acquired in 1913), then there is some explaining to do. If Greece expelled the Macedonians, suppressed their language, or got them to leave through harassment or oppressive policies, none of these are going to be admissions to the credit of Greece, or admissions likely to be made, for just such a reason. At the very least, the FYRM can reasonably ask for an accounting on this issue.
I am informed that Greeks would be happy with the FYRM simply being called "Northern Macedonia."
This is a little silly and is not going to make any difference in any Macedonian claims or possible threat against Greece. A parallel situation in Europe is actually the relationship of
Luxembourg to
Belgium. When Belgium became independent of the Netherlands in 1830, it took with it a very large part of Luxembourg. This area of Belgium is still called "Luxembourg." I have never heard that Luxembourg, which itself became independent of the Netherlands in 1890, today makes any claims against Belgium. But even if it did, tiny Luxembourg, although with the highest per capita income in the world, would not constitute any kind of real threat. Poor and tiny Macedonia is not going to constitute any more of a threat to Greece. If Macedonian guerrillas were crossing over into Greece, this would be a matter of real concern and complaint, but I do not understand that anything of the sort has happened; and even if it did, Greece would have no difficulty knowing where to direct counter-action.
As it has happened, the problem of guerrillas has troubled the FYRM itself. Albanian refugees inundated northern Macedonia in 1999, where there was already, as noted, an Albanian community. With them came armed Albanians who, having lost in battle with the Serbs, were interested in "liberating" northern Macedonia. They succeeded no better there, but for a while there was considerable danger of a wider conflict. Meanwhile, Macedonia is the poorest of the former Yugoslav Republics, with a lower per capita income even than Albania. This puts it perilously close to being the poorest country in Europe -- though it is probably safe from that, since Moldova has a per capita income of not much over $300, while Macedonia's is more than $1500. "Room for improvement" hardly begins to tell the tale. The dispute over Macedonia's name and claims doesn't even begin to address the real problem economic development in the FYRM and elsewhere in the Balkans.
A major part of Serbia itself since 1913, the province of Kosovo was only 10% Serb in population. Most of the rest were Albanian Moslems, who had been deprived of the autonomy they had under the old Yugoslavia and were now beginning to fight for independence through the radical Islamic
"Kosova Liberation Army" (KLA). What many observers expected, then, was that the Serbs would turn the "ethnic cleansing" campaign made famous in Bosnia to the problem of too many Albanians, especially rebellious Albanians, in Kosovo. With the UN and the NATO allies already energized about Bosnia, simple defiance was not going to work for the Serbs the way it might have if action had been taken against Kosovo before all the events in Bosnia. But defiance was the approach that the Serbs took, over a land to which they emotionally claimed "historic rights," but which had mostly been occupied by others since the 17th century and had been in Serbian hands only since 1913. Although many Serbs now cite atrocities during World War II or say there was even "ethnic cleansing" against them under Tito, their claim to Kosovo is mainly as part of "historic" (i.e. 14th century) Serbia.
Unfortunately, in modern Europe several wars have been fought between France and Germany, Italy and Austria, Germany and Poland, etc., over many such "historic" claims. Such things made a poor rationale for dictatorial and terrorist measures, especially by an undemocratic country. When NATO decided to move against Serbian measures in Kosovo in March 1999, we ended up with the next round of the ongoing Balkans War. This time, however, the naked preference of the Russians for the Orthodox Serbs over the Moslem Albanians, and similar sentiments evidently shared by Greeks and others, left the Albanians with no local friends at all. Albania itself has been a basket case of anarchy and corruption almost the whole time since the end of Communism there. But the outcome of such a conflict was very problematic when the NATO countries would rather fight a quick, high tech war on the cheap, before body bags and anti-war sentiment upsets things at home, while the Serbs, who learned their ruthlessness from Marshal Tito, wanted nothing better than to appear as martyrs of America, even while burning villages and driving people out of Kosovo. A century of war thus ended more or less as it began, with Serbian grievance dragging others into a war, while NATO, unable to commit on the ground, ended up bombing civilian infrastructure in Serbia, contrary to international law, in a rapidly growing "total war."
In June 1999, the Serbs finally gave in, after heavy bombing of Serbia itself, and the
Kosovars, driving out the remaining Serbs of Kosovo and attempting to provoke an Albanian rising in Macedonia, have behaved more or less the way the Serbs did. But Kosovo now seems headed for long term autonomy or even
independence.
A Brief
Historical Overview of the Development of Albanian Nationalism
Bernd J. Fischer
Bernd J. Fischer is Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Indiana
University-Fort Wayne. He spoke at an EES noon discussion on March 23, 2005. The
following is a summary of his presentation. Meeting Report 313.
The most dangerous outcome of the destruction of command socialism in the
Balkans has been the resurfacing of militant nationalism particularly, it seems,
in the western part of the peninsula. These events have encouraged a
reexamination of the various Balkan nationalisms in terms of origins and course.
It is the purpose of this paper briefly to examine the Albanian variant and some
aspects of nationalist formation during its various stages of development,
followed by some thoughts on the future of nationalism in Albania.
Albania was the last of the Balkan nations to achieve independence, and the last
to develop a modern national consciousness. Why was nationalist development in
Albania delayed and, when it finally arrived, what form did it take? While these
questions are complex, the former can be understood in terms of both conscious
Ottoman policy and the nature of the Albanians themselves. The Ottomans, who
ruled the Albanians for some four centuries, instituted policies that
effectively inhibited the development of a national consciousness. Some of these
policies were applied to the Balkan peoples in general while others were applied
only to the Albanians. As an example of the former, the Ottomans divided their
subjects into administrative units without regard to nationality, with Albanians
being divided into four separate vilayets, or administrative regions. Religion
was not associated with nationality in Albania, as it was in much of the rest of
the Balkans. Instead, the Ottomans correctly concluded that language, education
and culture were the critical elements in the development of Albanian
nationalism. In response, severe restrictions were placed on teaching the
Albanian language, which impeded the process of a common written language that
could lead to a common literature, the subsequent discovery of a common past and
the growth of modern nationalism.
But not all the obstacles that the Ottomans placed in the way of the development
of Albanian nationalism were oppressive. Albanians found themselves in a favored
position within the Ottoman Empire and therefore did not share the level of
discontent with foreign rule felt by most of the other Balkan peoples. Quite the
contrary, the Albanians often saw the Turks as protectors against the often
hostile Greeks and Serbs. For many Albanians, the Ottoman Empire provided a
career with the opportunity for advancement in the army or within the
administration, where they served in disproportionate numbers.
Moreover, the Turks were not responsible for all of the obstacles in the way of
the growth of Albanian nationalism. The nature of Albanian civilization and
heritage provided important indigenous obstacles. The divisions and various
levels of development within the Albanian community encouraged clanism and
localism, and inhibited thinking in national terms. The existence of three or
four (including Bektashi Muslims) religious groups prevented churches from
playing the unifying role that they played in many other areas of Eastern
Europe. Much more importantly, the nature of Albanian society provided a
powerful block to unity. Apart from the religious differences, the Albanians
were also divided linguistically, culturally, socially and economically. This
disunity was fostered by the co-existence of three conflicting stages of
civilization: the fiercely independent mountain clans in the North, the feudal
Beys in the South (who ruled over a generally docile Muslim Tosk peasantry) and
the more educated and urbanized population of the Hellenic and Catholic fringes.
The Turks took advantage of the disunity and lack of development by instigating
discord between these stages of civilization, often assuming the role of
arbiter.
Albania, then, was at something of a disadvantage when it comes to the 19th
century emergence of Balkan nationalism, since it lacked all of the necessary
preconditions for its emergence. Albania had no state, it could not look back to
a powerful medieval empire, it had no religious unity and no leadership offered
by a self-conscious class. Albania had little foreign intellectual stimulus and
lacked linguistic unity. It did not even have a population particularly
discontented with foreign rule.
When modern nationalism did finally reach the Albanians, it was late, rather
weak and certainly unique. Albanian nationalism was essentially an elite-driven
20th century phenomenon. While other Eastern European variants were
imported—often from Europe through Germany—Albanian nationalism in its infancy
was actually developed abroad, beyond the reach of Ottoman officials. The first
real spark of Albanian nationalism as a cultural awakening took place among the
Italo-Albanians of southern Italy in the 1860s. But since these intellectuals
wrote in Italian and the illiteracy rate in Albania was in excess of 90 percent,
naturally their influence was limited.
While there were several examples of what might be called political
proto-nationalism among the Albanians in the last quarter of the 19th century,
these movements tended to be limited and their adherents divided among
themselves. It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that Albanians,
in significant numbers, began to participate in the growing national movement
that sought the traditional goal of modern nationalists, the nation state. There
are a number of possible explanations for this increased participation at the
beginning of the 20th century. The aggressive policy of the Young Turks, whose
efforts at centralization interfered with traditional Albanian freedoms, played
a major role. The result was a revolt in Kosovo in 1909, the first of a series
of sporadic revolts that, by 1912, engulfed all Albanian-inhabited lands.
The second significant factor that helps to explain the rise of Albanian
national consciousness around the turn of the century was the increasing
interest in Albanian matters by foreign powers, particularly Italy and
Austria-Hungary. While the Albanians had no ‘benefactors’ like others in the
Balkans, they believed these two powers to be intent on preventing the expansion
of Greece and Serbia at the expense of Albanian inhabited lands. Through the
efforts of Italy and Austria-Hungary in shipping, trade and education, many
Albanians were exposed to western ideas and western culture. By becoming aware
of the world outside, Albanians also became more aware of their national
interests and their individuality.
While these external factors were important, considerable credit for this first
step toward the construction of an Albanian national consciousness must go to a
handful of intellectuals (primarily from southern Albania and abroad) who often
served as a link between the various parts of the country. Although very much
divided in terms of goals, most, like Abdul Frasheri and his brothers, were
involved in an unarmed struggle to achieve cultural autonomy which they
perceived as the necessary first step toward the creation of a national
sentiment. Most opposed armed struggle fearing foreign intervention and saw
Albania’s future as closely linked with a strengthened, more modern Ottoman
Empire.
Ismail Kemal Bey, often described as the father of Albanian independence, can be
counted among this group. The privileged son of a wealthy Muslim feudal lord
from Vlore, Ismail Kemal had no illusions about the level of Albanian
development. While he believed that the Albanians had maintained a certain
autonomy and “the religion of patriotism,” it is clear from his programs and
policies that his comments were meant in a very general sense; he was describing
nationalism in its infancy. His policy was simple and remained constant until
just before the declaration of Albanian independence. Ismail Kemal, along with
most educated Albanian patriots, supported the unification of the four vilayets
inhabited by Albanians and the attainment of administrative autonomy—to be
achieved not through armed insurrection but through collaboration between all
the oppressed nationalities of the empire.
But the rapid defeat of Ottoman forces in the First Balkan War complicated the
situation for the Albanians. Much Albanian territory was occupied by Serbs and
Greeks, who saw the area as legitimate spoils. In the face of this crisis Ismail
Kemal decided that independence—regardless of how unprepared the Albanians
were—was the only way to save Albanian lands from dismemberment. And with the
support of Austria-Hungary and Italy, success was at least possible. A
hastily-called assembly proclaimed the independence of Albania on November 28,
1912. Ismail Kemal thus created Albania (although with only just over half of
all Albanian speakers within its borders) in response to the threat of
assimilation. His next goal was to create an Albanian national consciousness,
but he was not given the time. Ismail Kemal saw his new fledgling state
overwhelmed by events and, with the beginning of World War I, by the armies of
six different powers. Following the war, the struggle to construct a national
consciousness needed to be restarted, essentially from the beginning, as the war
had contributed to the resurrection of clanism and localism.
Albania emerged from the First World War battered, with much of its territory
occupied, and its marginal pre-war state infrastructure destroyed by the war.
The war did, however, further Kemal’s work in one sense: the extended foreign
occupation helped reinforce Albanian identity. But the process of constructing a
widespread national consciousness and the process of constructing a state
apparatus, was by necessity begun anew by Ahmed Zog, who dominated Albania
during the interwar years first as minister of the interior, then prime
minister, then president and finally as king.
Zog began his political career as a minor Muslim Gheg chieftain from the
northern district of Mati. Although he suffered from a somewhat truncated
education, his cunning, energy, willingness to use violence and sheer audacity
enabled him to seize control of the state in 1922 and take significant steps in
the direction of the construction of national unity and a national consciousness
that he saw as his principal task. Zog can be considered a non-traditional
nationalist in the sense he was not an irredentist. Zog declared to a western
reporter, in his usual paternalistic fashion, that “We are centuries behind the
rest of Europe in civilization. The people can neither read nor write: there are
few written laws which are obeyed, and blood feuds are still prevalent in many
parts of the country. It is my determination to civilize my people and make them
as far as possible adopt Western habits and customs.” He was able to further
this process through numerous means. Zog’s first priority was the creation of a
political structure that could prove strong enough to withstand the inevitable
strains that centralization and modernization would entail. The system that Zog
finally created was a reasonably stable, traditional, non-ideological,
authoritarian government in which limited political and social reform was
permitted, provided that Zog’s own position was not threatened in the process.
Zog’s religious and social policies also contributed to the growth of
rudimentary nationalism. His initiatives here included attempting to foster
unity through the improvement of Albania’s rather primitive transportation and
communication infrastructure. Some limited success was achieved here and by 1939
it was increasingly difficult for northern tribes to retreat into their mountain
fastness and simply ignore the central government in Tirana. Zog’s police and
tax collectors were given access to areas of Albania hitherto isolated not only
from the rest of Europe but from the rest of Albania as well. Zog also used the
tiny Albanian army as a means not only to enforce government policy but as a
sort of social and cultural melting pot, requiring recruits from different parts
of the country to serve together in the same units.
Further, Zog recognized that adherence to three different religions whose clergy
were answerable to hierarchies outside of Albania not only presented a block to
unity but allowed for considerable foreign interference in Albanian affairs. Zog
sought, therefore, through the construction of autocephalous churches, to bring
as many indigenous church leaders as possible under his control. While his
religious policies enjoyed some success, Zog understood that the key to both
modernism and nationalism was an aggressive education policy—nationalism would
have to be taught. Here he experienced some success. Those who succeeded him and
furthered the construction of a modern nation state found their task somewhat
less arduous as a result of the foundation of nationalism laid by Zog.
The experience of World War II served both to reinforce and to undermine the
growing national consciousness. Once again, the ordeal of foreign occupation did
much to reinforce Albanian distinctiveness. More importantly, the creation of a
Greater Albania (including most of Kosovo and part of Macedonia) with the
destruction of Yugoslavia did much to further the process as well. The
enthusiasm with which Kosovar Albanians in particular greeted the creation by
Italy of a “Greater Albania” speaks to the growth of negatively-reinforced
nationalism. Still, the divisive effect of the war was more profound. Following
the invasion and occupation, the Italians sought to integrate the traditional
Albanian elite into Mussolini’s new Roman Empire. Many elements of the pre-war
political and social hierarchy compromised themselves by cooperating with the
fascists and thereby contributing to what has been called the process of
“de-nationalization.” Fascist policy also fostered class division, since many in
Albania’s small middle class and an increasing number of peasants resented
Italian and (after 1943) German occupation. The division between North and South
was exacerbated by the formation of resistance groups with regional agendas.
Even the limited stability for which Zog was responsible was jeopardized. As a
result, much of the work done by Zog was undermined.
Following the German evacuation of Albania in November 1944 a fledgling
communist movement under the leadership of Enver Hoxha came to power. Hoxha, a
Muslim Tosk from the South, is best described as a Hoxhaist first—concerned with
maintaining power, then as a non-traditional (i.e., non-irredentist)
nationalist, and finally as a Stalinist communist. When Hoxha came to power, he
was faced with the task of rebuilding Albania on the foundation—or what was left
of it—laid by Zog. Like Zog, his main goal was predetermined and was, in the
simplest sense, the creation of a viable independent nation state and what he
colorfully described as the “monolithic unity . . . of the Albanian people.”
Although much of Albania’s Ottoman tradition still remained, in a very short
time Hoxha had succeeded in constructing a highly personal and reasonably stable
regime that was as totalitarian as any regime in a developing area could be in
1946. Hoxha succeeded in using the legacy of fascism, the wartime experience and
the fear of foreign intervention—in other words he appealed to nationalist
sentiment and created the atmosphere of a state of siege—to pursue more quickly
and effectively the political policies which Zog had attempted in the late
1920s. Despite the violent rhetoric of Stalinism, Hoxha really had no choice but
to become as ardent a nationalist as Zog had been. Indeed, given the narrow base
of support the communist movement had (in 1941 when the Albanian Communist Party
was formed, it had a membership of perhaps 130) and given Hoxha’s need to
downplay the Kosovo issue, extreme nationalism was the best means (aided by the
extensive use of the army and other security forces) by which Hoxha could remain
in power and progress toward a modern socialist state.
Like Zog, Hoxha was uncomfortable with irredentism, that is, with the concept of
a Greater Albania. Many of their reasons were similar, including their fear of
Kosovar chieftains, their fear of increasing the Gheg population (the communist
movement was primarily Tosk) with the added consideration that the very concept
was tainted with fascism. Although Hoxha followed a general non-interventionist
foreign policy then, nationalism (his extreme internal variant) still proved to
be the principal element in all of his policies—religious and social policies in
particular. The Albanian scholar Arshi Pipa summarized this trend by suggesting
that “Hoxha was decisive in producing a cultural atmosphere totally dominated by
a doctrinaire propaganda exalting nationalism. Linguistics, literature, history,
geography, folklore, and ethnology have been cultivated, not only to give the
people a sense of their own past, but also to spread and inculcate xenophobia,
slavophobia, isolationism, ethnic compactness, and linguistic uniformity.”
Perhaps one of the most widely recognized lasting manifestations of Hoxha’s
policies are the hundreds of thousands of concrete bunkers and pillboxes that
still scar the Albanian landscape.
The collapse of command socialism in the 1980s and 1990s further complicated the
situation. Postcommunist Albania is very much dominated by Hoxha’s legacy. Many
observers have suggested that the Hoxha years witnessed important achievements
in terms of structure, stability and unity. He is credited with reducing the
impact of divisive factors on Albanian society, such as regional loyalties, the
traditional North-South division and religious differences. These achievements
were in part accomplished through the completion of the process of nation state
construction, building on the achievements of King Zog. Hoxha is also credited
with the development of a strong sense of nationalism fostered in part by his
successful maintenance of Albania’s territorial integrity.
While more study is needed on this question, from the perspective of 20 years
after Hoxha’s death, it would seem that most, if not all, of these achievements
were offset by Hoxha’s rigid ideological conformity, extreme isolation as well
as the legacy of Hoxhaist terror. With the collapse of Communism in 1991,
Albania was convulsed by a violent rejection of everything associated with Hoxha,
making Albania’s transition to its next, yet-to-be-determined phase much more
difficult than that experienced by other Eastern European and Balkan states.
Albanians have violently rejected the various aspects of Hoxha’s ideology and
the symbols thereof—beginning with the basic authority of the central
government.
In rejecting Hoxha’s state of siege nationalism, many Albanians seem to have
replaced it with a return to regionalism (a certain revival of religion) and
even a certain anti-nationalism that is inhibiting the construction of an
Albanian version of civil society. The Albanians in Albania, then, entered the
post command-socialist era with a weakened sense of nationalism and, unlike with
Zog and Hoxha, traditional and non-traditional nationalist elites have been no
longer able to completely direct the process. That they continue to make an
effort is clear. This can be illustrated by, among other things, the
controversial 1998 paper issued by the Albanian Academy of Sciences called
“Platform for the Solution of the National Albanian Question,” which argues that
the “rightful aspiration of all Albanians is the unification of all ethnic
Albanian lands in a single national state.” While the academy has since
repudiated that position, a nationalist litmus test seems to be an important
part of survival tactics at both the university and the academy. A recent
example involves two geography professors who, with Stability Pact funding,
produced a new Albanian Atlas that suggested that minorities constituted
approximately 11 percent of the population of Albania, a considerable increase
from the oft-quoted 2 percent. Both professors were hounded and pressured by
colleagues and others, until one resigned his chairmanship at the university and
left the country and the other, who was head of department at the academy, was
forced to declare to the media that he believed the percentage of minorities was
2 percent.
But despite evidence of its vitality, the task of traditional intellectual
nationalists in Albania is more difficult because of resistance from colleagues
as well as pervasive outside influences, particularly from the West, that have
had enough of Balkan nationalism and continue to fear the notion of a Greater
Albania. The West pressures Albanian politicians to develop a more positive,
less aggressive, less chauvinistic and more ethnically inclusive non-traditional
nationalism. Most political elites in Albania have accepted the West’s
vision—extolling the concept of making borders obsolete through social and
cultural integration, and optimistically predicting Albania’s rapid integration
into the EU.
Whether Western pressure combined with the non-traditional nationalist elite
support for this vision of nationalism can impact the average Albanian remains
to be seen. So far, the type of virulent nationalism seen elsewhere in the
Balkans has not developed among the overwhelming majority of Albanians.
Irredentism—the key to traditional nationalism—seems to be the goal of only a
few. As with everything else in the Balkans, however, this is not set in stone.
If it is the aim of the West to help mitigate the development of strong
traditional nationalism among Albanians, I believe there are strategies
available that could facilitate this process. These strategies include the full
implementation of the Ohrid accords in Macedonia, extending real autonomy to
ethnic Albanians there and, perhaps more importantly, extending at least
conditional independence to Kosovo. And finally, as we all learned from a study
of the Balkans during the interwar period, attempting to solve the political
problem with no attention to economics will likely be unsuccessful. My venerable
Serbian mentor, Professor Dimitrije Djordjevic, was fond of repeating the old
Balkan adage: “An empty belly burns a hole in the flag.” This may likely be the
ultimate key to effectively discouraging the development of virulent,
traditional Albanian nationalism.
the poorest and least educated people in Europe, the Albanians had unexpected independence thrust upon them after the First Balkan War (1912-1913) and then found themselves locked into paranoid and pauperized
isolation by a particularly nasty and megalomanaical Communist regime after World War II, under longtime Communist Party Chief Enver Hoxha. After the schism between Comminist China and the Soviet Union, for many years Albania was China's only international ally and supporter, regularly submitting the PRC for membership in the United Nations. But eventually, after membership, China began allowing Capitalism, and Albania had to retreat into its own paranoid isolation as the last surviving Stalinist dictatorship. Since Hoxha expected the Capitalists to invade at any time, the Albanian landscape became covered with small bunkers, to defend every inch. The country, which had always been poor anyway, became even poorer in Hoxha's grip, and it is nowhere near even recovering, much less developing to the level of its European
neighbors. The Fall of Communism even witnessed large numbers of Albanians attempting to flee to Italy by boat. Among the mysterious, autochthonous peoples of the Balkans, the Albanians were strongly Latinized under Rome, Islamicized under Turkey, coveted by Italy and Serbia, and include substantial communities in Greece (denied by Greece, which officially has no ethnic minorities). Like a number of peoples in the Balkans, they may not know just what to make of themselves in the modern world, much less how their society is supposed to function. Recent conspicuous Americans of Albanian heritage have been the Belushis, John and his brother Jim, and Sandra Bullock (whose mother is German and father, reportedly, of Albanian derivation). One of John Belushi's memorable roles on Saturday Night Live was in the ongoing "Greek Diner" skits. The
Belushis, indeed, had run such a diner in Chicago.
